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ABSTRACT

Current financial valuation techniques fail to capture several important aspects of
technical projects, including flexibility and the interface between economics and
technology.  Additionally, valuations rarely aid in the process of determining which
service or product provides value to both the client and the provider. 
This thesis presents a new valuation framework that accounts for these downfalls by
breaking the valuation analysis into two distinct parts:  the client’s value and the
provider’s value.  The client value analysis is a necessary step in determining the
provider’s value, as it provides the basis for the revenue the provider will generate as well
as an idea of which type of service or product provides the most value to the client.  As a
viable market does not exist without both a client and a provider, it is necessary to look at
a project from both perspectives.
The valuation framework is used to analyze the commercial geosynchronous (GEO)
satellite servicing market.  Several approaches of servicing are examined and compared
to current satellites and electric propulsion, which are considered the most probable
competition for servicing.  The analysis indicates that two primary types of satellite
servicing provide value to both the client and provider - using direct GEO insertion and
either a tug spacecraft to perform the client’s North-South stationkeeping maneuvers or a
refueling vehicle enable the spacecraft to perform its own stationkeeping maneuvers. 

Thesis Supervisor:  Joyce Warmkessel
Title:  Senior Lecturer in Aeronautics and Astronautics
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Chapter 1.   Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The decision of whether or not to pursue a new large-scale project is crucial to the
success of any company in the aerospace industry.  To make this decision, many aspects
of the project must be considered, including both its technical and economic feasibility.
These two aspects of feasibility are generally intertwined.  For example, a project may be
technologically feasible if a company is willing to spend exorbitant amounts of money on
development.  In this respect, the project may make technological sense, but its financial
viability is compromised by the development costs. 
Projects are often undertaken without sufficient understanding of what the most valuable
product is.  This happens for several reasons.  First, traditional valuation techniques do
not capture the interactions between technology and economics.  Also, they tend to
underestimate project value by neglecting the inherent flexibility found in most projects.
Finally, traditional valuation techniques do not shed light on what the “right” product is.
One type of project that suffers from the shortcomings traditional valuations is the
geosynchronous (GEO) satellite servicing.  There exists a fairly large body of research in
the area of satellite serving.  Some studies have examined the technical aspects of
servicing.  Others have attempted to capture the value of servicing, by applying both
traditional and more recently developed valuation techniques.  However, the viability of
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the commercial GEO satellite servicing market has yet to be examined from a valuation
perspective that accounts for both the technology and economics associated with
servicing and determines which servicing configurations and architectures provide the
most value to both the potential client and provider. 
1.2 Research Objectives
In response the motivation above, this research has two primary objectives:
• Develop a valuation framework that accounts for the technical aspects, the
economic aspects, and the flexibility of the project; and sheds light on what
the “right” product is.
• Apply this framework to the GEO satellite servicing market to determine its
viability from the perspective of both the potential client and provider.
1.3 Thesis Overview
Chapter 2 presents the background for this research.  First, it introduces a new launch
vehicle concept, Aquarius, which was the initial motivation for the analysis of the
commercial GEO satellite market.  Next, it presents an overview of real options, a
technique used to value the flexibility in projects.  Finally, it presents a brief overview of
previous and ongoing research on satellite servicing.  Chapter 3 presents a new valuation
framework, which incorporates the technical and economic aspects of a potential project,
as well as the flexibility of the project, and a determination of what the “right” product is.
Chapter 4 and 5 present the application of this framework to the commercial GEO
satellite servicing market.  Chapter 4 focuses on the value servicing provides to the
potential client, while Chapter 5 uses the information from Chapter 4 to determine the
value of the market from the perspective of the servicing provider.  Chapter 6 presents the
conclusions of the research as well as future research opportunities.
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Chapter 2.   Background
2.1 Introduction
This chapter serves to introduce background on three key aspects of the research. First, it
introduces a new launch vehicle concept, Aquarius, the initial motivation for the analysis
of the commercial GEO satellite market.  Next, it presents an overview of real options, a
technique used to value the flexibility in projects.  Finally, it presents a brief overview of
previous and current research on satellite servicing.
2.2 Aquarius:  A New Perspective on Launching
Consumables
This section introduces a new launch vehicle concept, Aquarius.  The primary idea
behind the Aquarius is to reduce the cost of launching low-cost items, such as fuel or
water, by designing a launch vehicle with less emphasis on reliability.  First, the rationale
behind the paradigm shift Aquarius represents is discussed.  Next, the basic design of the
launch vehicle is presented.  Finally, a brief description of possible markets for Aquarius
is presented. As several articles about Aquarius are published, this section will not
present an in-depth discussion of Aquarius.  Rather, it will highlight the primary concepts
behind Aquarius.  This thesis is not intended to endorse the Aquarius launch vehicle,
rather, Aquarius is presented as an interesting approach to reducing launch costs and used
it as a way to examine the satellite servicing market.
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2.2.1 Paradigm Shift
In recent years much of the focus on improving launch capabilities has been on
increasing reliability.  This is because launches are very expensive and the cargo aboard
launch vehicles is very valuable, making a launch failure very costly. Given this
environment, why would someone propose to develop a low reliability launch vehicle?
Launch vehicles today cost almost as much as the spacecraft they carry.  Generally about
half of the mass of a launched spacecraft is propellant mass, which is clearly much less
valuable than the spacecraft itself. One concept for reducing launch costs is to launch
high value items on high reliability launch vehicles, and relegate low value items to low-
cost, low-reliability launch vehicles.  This would reduce the cost of launch by allowing
spacecraft to be launched without fuel and put on smaller launch vehicles or to be
launched with an increased number of spacecraft on one launch vehicle.  Another option
would be to increase the payload onboard a given spacecraft, increasing its capabilities
for the same launch cost.
2.2.2 Aquarius Conceptual Design and Potential Markets
As a low-reliability, moderate-performance launch vehicle Aquarius, expects up to one-
third of its launches to fail.  As a result, it is not feasible to launch the vehicle from a
launch pad because the pad would likely have to be replaced often.  Instead, Aquarius is
launched from the water.  (See Figure 2-1)
 
 19

Figure 2-1 Aquarius Low Reliability Launch Vehicle Concept1
Although floating launches are certainly not common today, they have been demonstrated
several times in the past (Draim, 1997).
The Aquarius launch vehicle uses liquid hydrogen and oxygen as its propellants.  Its total
liftoff mass is approximately 130 tons, with a payload of approximately 1 ton.2   Its
configuration is show in Figure 2-2.

                                               
1
 Adapted from Aquarius presentation, by Andrew Turner, Space Systems/LORAL.
2
 For a more in-depth technical description of Aquarius see (Turner, Ref. 3, 2000).
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Figure 2-2 Aquarius Launch Vehicle Layout3 
The Aquarius vehicle is designed to take low intrinsic value consumables to high value
clients.  Thus, it needs a high reliability interface between itself and client spacecraft.
This is provided by a space “tugboat” which docks with Aquarius, removes the payload,
and then returns to an on-orbit storage depot where the payload is stored until the client is
ready to receive it.  This process is illustrated in Figure 2-3.

                                               
3
 Adapted from (Turner 1, 2001)
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Figure 2-3 Aquarius Mission Profile 4
The Aquarius vehicle is designed primarily to minimize cost, even if that leads to
degrading its performance and reliability.  By reducing the reliability, it would be
possible to reduce extensive testing or rework on the vehicle or in-depth investigations of
failures, which are very costly.  Additionally, by removing performance as a primary
driver, costly turbo-pumps become unnecessary.  Instead, they can be replaced by a low
cost pressure-fed propulsion system (Turner, Ref. 1, 2001).
As much of the cargo that is launched to space is inherently low value, there are several
possible markets for Aquarius.   These markets include, but are not limited to:
• International Space Station (re-supply: water, food, duct tape, etc.) 
• Satellite servicing market (fuel delivery)
• Military operations (fuel delivery)
                                               
4
 Adapted from “Aquarius Launch Vehicle:  Failure is an Option.”
http://www.astronautical.org/pubs/vol40i3Feat.htm, February 28, 2002.
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The primary reason that this description of Aquarius is included in this thesis is because
the author began her research by using Aquarius as a case study for new valuation
techniques.  In the process, it was discovered that in order to do a valuation of Aquarius,
it was necessary to do a valuation of its potential markets.  This led to the satellite
servicing market analysis presented in Chapters 4 and 5.  The satellite servicing analysis
is presented from the perspective of using a low cost launch vehicle, such as Aquarius.
2.3 Financial Valuation Tools
This section introduces the concepts behind real options, considers the benefits and
downfalls of other financial valuation tools, investigates different scenarios that yield
themselves to being valued using real options, and illustrates how real options can be
used to evaluate projects in the aerospace industry.  This section also includes an example
valuation, comparing net present value, decision tree analysis, and real options. 
Some of the tools shown below, namely net present value/discounted cash flow and real
options are used throughout the remainder of this thesis to value the satellite servicing
market.  The net present value/discounted cash flow approach is used in the satellite
servicing analysis to capture the value of each case before accounting for flexibility. The
real options approach is utilized to take into account the inherent flexibility in satellite
servicing.  The background for their use is presented here.
2.3.1 What is the Real Options Approach?
The real options approach is a financial valuation technique that uses the concepts behind
financial option pricing theory (OPT) to value "real" (non-financial) assets.  It is a tool
that can be used to value projects that have "risky" or contingent future cash flows, as
well as long-term projects; projects that are typically undervalued by standard valuation
tools.  An option is defined as the ability, but not the obligation, to exploit a future
profitable opportunity. 
Most projects have options embedded in them.  These options give managers the chance
to adapt and revise decisions based upon new information or developments.  For
example, if a project is determined to be an unprofitable venture for a company, the
project can be abandoned.  The option to abandon a project has value, especially when
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future investments are necessary to continue the project.   The real options approach
captures this value, along with the value of uncertainty in a project.  Real options and
option pricing theory will be used interchangeably throughout the remainder of the
section.
2.3.2 How Does Real Options Compare to Standard Valuation
Techniques?
Traditional Net Present Value (NPV)
NPV is a standard financial tool that compares the positive and negative cash flows for a
project by using a discount rate to adjust future dollars to "current" dollars.  The
following equation can be used to calculate NPV.

=
+
=
N
i
i
i
r
CNPV
1 )1(

where r is the discount rate, Ci  is the cash flow in period i, and N is the total number of
periods.  The discount rate is determined by the expected rate of return in the capital
markets and accounts for the “riskiness” of the project.  
Two major deficiencies exist in this method. Managerial flexibility is ignored, and the
choice of discount rates is very subjective.  Managers often use inappropriately high
discount rates to value projects (Dixit, 1994).  In addition, NPV does not take into
account the flexibility and influence of future actions inherent in most projects.  Both
using a high discount rate and ignoring the flexibility of using future "options" to make
strategic decisions tend to lead to the under valuation of projects.  However, one of the
primary benefits of the NPV approach is that it is simple and understood by many people.
Discounted Cash Flow (DCF)
DCF is simply the sum of the present values of future cash flows.  It has the same
drawbacks as listed for NPV.  It inherently assumes that an investor is passive.  This
means that once a project is started it will be completed without future strategic decisions
based upon future information or outcomes.  Thus, it typically leads to undervalued
projects because it does not take into account the value of the options for future action.
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As with NPV, one its main benefits is its universal use.  It is also adaptable to many types
of projects.
Decision Tree Analysis
Decision analysis is a straightforward method of laying out future decisions and sources
of uncertainty.   It uses probability estimates of outcomes to determine the value of a
project. By doing this, it is one of the few methods that takes into account managerial
flexibility.  The major downfall to this approach is that probability estimates are generally
very subjective and as such are hard to form with much precision.  The equations for this
method are presented below in the example calculation.
Simulation Analysis
Simulation analysis lays out many possible paths for the uncertain variables in a project.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to model decisions that occur before the final decision date
using simulation analysis.  This and the use of a subjective discount rate are the major
drawbacks of this method of valuation.
2.3.3 Where can the Real Options Approach be Utilized?
The real options approach is a suitable method for valuing projects that:
• include contingent investment decisions
• have a large enough uncertainty that it is sensible to wait for more information before
making a particular decision
• have a large enough uncertainty to make flexibility a significant source of value
• have future growth options
• have project updates and mid-course strategy corrections
As can be seen above, a real options analysis is not needed for all cases.  Traditional
methods of valuation correctly value businesses that consistently produce the same or
slightly declining cash flow each year without further investment or follow-on
opportunities.  Real options are not necessary for projects with negligible levels of
uncertainty.  (Amram, 1999)
 25
2.3.4 Where can Real Options be Utilized in the Aerospace
Industry?
The following are hypothetical examples used to illustrate the value of real options.
Waiting-To-Invest Options
BizJet, a company that produces business jets, is considering becoming the first to enter
the supersonic business jet market.  It has the option to start development today or to wait
until the market outlook changes. Real options can capture the value of delaying this
decision until the market uncertainty is resolved.
Growth Options
CallSat, a company that offers satellite cellular phone service, is considering entering the
market in the populated areas of South America.  This would require a significant
investment.  If this investment is made it would leave the option open to increase service
in the future to the less populated areas of South America if the market proved to be
worthwhile.  A real options analysis of this project would include the value of the future
option to increase service area.
Flexibility Options
Entertainment Sat is considering developing a constellation of satellites that provides
either standard satellite television service or a new pay-per-view downloadable movie
service.  Instrument A is needed on the satellite to provide television service and
Instrument B is needed to provide downloadable movie service.  Instrument C is more
expensive than both A and B but it allows the satellite to provide either television or
movie service.  Real options can be used to value the flexibility of Instrument C, taking
into account the fact that if one of the two markets proves to be less profitable than
expected, or the opposite occurs, Instrument C has the ability to capture the most
profitable market at any given time.
Exit Options
Sky ISP, a proposed satellite internet service provider, is interested in providing very fast
internet connections throughout the US, using a constellation of satellites.  Their fear is
that the market is not large enough to support the substantial investment necessary to
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fund the development of satellites.  Market forecasts look good today but what will they
look like in a year when the satellites will be launched, requiring additional funding?
Real options recognizes that the project can be abandoned if the market forecasts
deteriorate.  This option to abandon has value in that it limits the downside potential of a
project.
Learning Option
StarSat  is doing research on a new tracking instrument that will help satellites point more
accurately towards their target.  There are several different levels of accuracy foreseen as
feasible, each requiring an additional investment.  StartSat has the ability to stage its
investments in order to capitalize on learning effects.  If through developing the first
tracker they gain knowledge about how to develop the next tracker, the future investment
can be altered.  The real options approach values the contingent decisions based upon the
learning curve that StarSat faces. 
2.3.5 Valuations:  Using the Binomial Real Options Approach
This section will walk the reader through a simple example of valuation to illustrate the
differences between net present value, decision tree analysis, and real options.  The
reader should take note of a few key points throughout the example.  First, the NPV
approach does not correctly value options because it assumes that once a project is
started, it will be completed regardless of the outcome.  Second, DTA and OPT
valuations both take into account managerial flexibility, but do not result in the same
answers.  This is due to the way the two methods discount the value of options.  DTA
uses the same discount rate to discount the underlying project as well as the options.
Since an option is always more risky than its underlying asset (Brealey and Myers, 1996),
OPT valuations discount the option at a higher rate.  This is more consistent with the
theory that riskier cash flows should be discounted at a higher rate. 
The valuation will be based upon the following scenario:
Sky ISP, as introduced previously, faces the following scenario.  The market outlook
for one year from now will either have high or low demand.  If the demand for
Internet connections is high, the market will be worth $800M and if the demand is
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low the market will be worth $200M.  The satellites will be launched in one year for a
cost of $300M.  An initial investment of $250M must be made today in order to
continue building the satellites needed to complete the system.
In financial market terms, the launch scenario corresponds to owning a call option on
a stock with a price equal to the value (see calculation below) of the market and an
exercise price of $300M (the cost of launching the satellites).
The market outcomes are illustrated in Figure 2-4.
Figure 2-4 Predicted Market Outcomes for Year 1
The information needed in the analysis to follow is summarized here ($M):
• Initial investment today to continue building satellites, I:   $250
• Present value of market without option to launch (calculation below), S: $509
• Future value of market with high demand, uS:     $800
• Future value of market with low demand, dS:     $200
• Probability of high demand, p:       60%
• Probability of low demand, 1-p:       40%
• Discount rate, r:         10%
• Exercise price, E:         $300
• Maturity, t:         1 year
• Risk-free interest rate, rf:        5%
In this example, a distinction will be made between the market and the project.  The value
of the market is defined as the amount of money a business would make if entering the
    Low
Demand
$200M
$800M
PVmarket=?
   High
demand
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market had zero costs associated with it.  The value of the business/project is defined as
the value of the market minus the cost of entering the market.(i.e. the exercise price of the
option).  In this case, the cost of entering the market is the cost of launch.  The present
value of the market is:
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Net present value calculation  
The NPV of the business is found using the following formula.      
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This formula simply takes the value of the project in year 1 and discounts it back to year
0.  Using the assumptions above the net present value of the project is:
1.1
300$200$4.0
1.1
300$800$6.0 −×+−×=NPV -$250=-$14
The NPV valuation assumes that the option is exercised regardless of the market
outcome. This is obviously flawed because a rational manager would not choose to
launch the satellites if the demand were lower than the cost of launch.  This leads to a
negative NPV valuation. 
Decision tree analysis calculation  
Traditionally, this project would either not be undertaken because of its negative
valuation, or a manager would go with his/her “gut” feeling that Sky ISP is a worthwhile
project.  Although this project is worthwhile as long as one considers the options (a.k.a.
managerial flexibility) involved, it would be helpful to be able to quantify the manager’s
“gut” feeling.  One method of remedying this is to use decision tree analysis.  In finance
terms, this method recognizes the manager’s ability to not exercise the call option (i.e.
launch the satellites) if the demand is low.  This is illustrated below, where circles
represent event nodes and squares represent decision nodes. The bold lettering indicates
what decision a rational manager would make in the given situation. 
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Figure 2-5: Decision Tree used for Decision Analysis and Real Options Valuation

The value of this project, according to decision analysis, is calculated using the following
formula.
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In this case, the decision tree analysis method gives:
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This valuation is significantly higher than the NPV approach because it assumes that the
project would be abandoned if the launch costs exceeded the size of the market.
Real options calculation  
The final approach covered here is real options.  Using the binomial method (Brealey and
Myers, 1996), there are two ways to approach this valuation.  The one that will be used
here is the risk-neutral approach. 
E = $300M
Launch?
Invest?
uS = $800M
-$250M
No
Yes
 uS - E = $500M
dS - E = -$100M
$0M
$0M
p
1-p
dS = $200M
Yes
No
Yes
E = $300M
No
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The risk-neutral approach is based on the surprising fact that the value of an option is
independent of investors’ preferences towards risk.  Therefore, the value of the option in
a risk-neutral world, where investors are indifferent to risk, equals the option’s value in
the real world.
If Sky ISP were indifferent to risk, the manager would be content if the business offered
the risk-free rate of return of 5%.  The value of the market is either going to increase to
$800, a rise of 57%, or decrease to $200, a fall of 61%. 
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This yields a probability of rise in the risk-neutral world of 56%.  The true probability of
the market rising is 60%.  However, options are always riskier than their underlying asset
(i.e. the project itself), which leads to the use of different probabilities for valuation.   The
use of risk-neutral probabilities effectively increases the discount rate used to value the
option.
If there is low demand in the market, the market with the option to launch will be worth
nothing.  On the other hand, if the demand in the market is high, the manager will choose
to launch and make 800-300 = 500, or $500M.  Therefore, the expected future value of
the market with the option is
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Still assuming a risk-neutral world, the future value is discounted at the risk-free rate  to
find the current value of the project with the option to launch as
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The value of the option to launch is the difference between the value of the business with
the option (the OPT valuation) and the value of the business without the option (i.e. the
NPV).
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Multiple option example  
Although single options are often very important to analyze, as they may be all that a
business faces, multiple or compound options are generally more interesting.  Adding
another option to the one discussed above produces interesting results.  Assume that one-
year after the launch decision is made, a new satellite data transfer market emerges.  This
market has a 30% chance of being worth $400M and a 70% of being worth $50.  The
operations and marketing costs of entering this new market amount to $100M.  The
situation is illustrated graphically in the figure below, where the probabilities shown are
the probabilities used in the NPV and decision analysis valuations.  The risk-neutral
probabilities, used in OPT, are not shown. 
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Figure 2-6  Example of Multiple Options

Although the calculations will not be covered in detail here, the NPV, DTA, and OPT
valuations are listed below for various cases.   In the analysis the following are used:
• uS1: Future value of original market with high demand
• dS1: Future value of original market with low demand
• E1:   Exercise price of option to launch (cost of launch)
• uS2: Future value of new data transfer market with high demand
• dS2: Future value of new data transfer market with low demand
• E2:   Exercise price of option to expand (cost of expansion)
• r1:    Discount rate for launch option = 10%
• r2:   Discount rate for option to expand = 15%
• rr:     Risk-free interest rate = 5%
All numbers below are in $M.
Invest?
Yes
    0.3
 0.7
 $50
$400 -$100M
-$100M$200M
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-$100M$400
    0.3
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 33
Table 2-1  Various Cases of Two Option Valuation
Case
number
uS1 dS1 E1 uS2 dS2 E2 NPV  DTA OPT Option to
launch
Option to
expand
1 800 200 300 400 50 100 30 65 52 22 75
2 800 200 300 600 50 100 77 105 89 11 127
3 800 50 300 400 50 100 -25 65 59 84 75
4 800 200 400 400 50 100 -61 11 0 61 75
5 800 200 300 400 50 200 -14 51 40 54 50

Case 1 is the baseline case for the rest of the analysis.  It illustrates how the addition of
the option to expand significantly increases the value of the project. 
Case 2 illustrates the effect of increasing the upside potential of the option to expand. 
As can be seen above, it significantly increases the value of the project.  It also makes the
option to launch worth less because even if the initial demand were low, the option to
expand makes it worthwhile to launch the satellites.
Case 3 illustrates the effect of decreasing the future value of the original market with low
demand.  In this case, the value of the option to launch increases because one can choose
not to launch if the demand were low.  As expected, the DTA value of the project does
not change because the manager would only launch if the demand were high.
Case 4 illustrates the effect of increasing the exercise price of the option to launch (i.e.
increasing the launch costs).  The NPV valuation becomes negative, while the OPT
valuation goes to zero.  The reason that the DTA valuation remains positive is due to the
way in which discounting takes place. 
Case 5 illustrates the effect of increasing the exercise price of the option to expand (i.e.
increasing the cost of entering the new data transfer market).  The NPV is much more
negative than the DTA or OPT valuations because it does not correctly value options.  In
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addition, this case is a good example of the DTA valuation being greater than the OPT
valuation.  This is due to the different ways that DTA and OPT treat discount rates. 
2.3.6 Extension to the Black-Scholes Formula
Thus far, all quantitative discussion of real options in this thesis is based upon the
binomial method.  This is a simplified version of option pricing theory that assumes that
there are only two possible outcomes for a project.  Although this method can be used to
value options over short time periods or in very special cases where only two outcomes
are possible, it is often unrealistic. 
One means of solving this issue is to break the total time period into smaller intervals.  
For an example of this refer to Brealey and Myers, 1996.  As the time interval period
used for each option shortens, the valuation becomes more realistic because more
outcomes are possible.  Ideally one would keep shortening the interval periods until
eventually the stock price (or project value) varies continuously.  This leads to a
continuum of possible outcomes.  Fortunately, this is exactly what the Black-Scholes
formula, which the authors were awarded the 1997 Nobel Prize in Economics for, does.
The formula is
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and
P     = share price (value of project)
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r       = risk-free interest rate
PV(E) = present value of exercise price of option (discounted using risk-free rate)
t     = number of periods to exercise date

     = volatility of the share price per period of rate return (continuously compounded) 
      on stock
In addition to accounting for the fact that projects generally have a continuum of possible
outcomes, the Black-Scholes formula does not require an arbitrary discount rate.
Although the binomial method does not technically use a discount rate, using a discount
rate is almost always inevitable to determine the present value of the price of the stock
(i.e. project).
2.4 Satellite Servicing
Satellite servicing represents a paradigm shift in the way space systems are currently
designed and maintained.  This section presents an overview of the history of servicing,
including actual on-orbit servicing of space hardware as well as previous research.  In
addition, a brief introduction to a current satellite servicing program is presented.
2.4.1 History of Servicing
The idea of using another spacecraft to aid in performing maneuvers, maintenance and
upgrade operations seems quite revolutionary.  However, there are many instances of on-
orbit upgrades and maintenance being performed.  These include Skylab, the Russian
Space Stations Program, and the International Space Station.  Although these are all
manned missions, they represent a desire to maintain and upgrade space hardware on
orbit. 
Servicing of unmanned spacecraft
The first unmanned spacecraft to be serviced on orbit was the Solar Maxim Mission
(Waltz, 1993).  The spacecraft was serviced by the Challenger Shuttle astronauts because
it was deemed more cost-effective to do so than to build a replacement spacecraft.  Since
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then, Shuttle astronauts have performed several unanticipated maintenance missions
(Lamassoure, 2001).
The most well known example is the servicing missions performed on the Hubble Space
Telescope (HST).  The first servicing mission, in 1993, was a repair mission to correct for
a flawed mirror.  The second servicing mission, in 1997, served as an upgrade mission by
installing new instruments.  The third servicing mission, in December 2001, upgraded
components and replaced failing gyroscopes. The fourth servicing (originally planned as
part of the third servicing mission), in March 2002, installed a new camera, for increased
imaging capability, and performed other needed upgrades.  The fifth servicing of HST is
scheduled for 2004.
Although each of the missions above required the use of astronauts, as opposed to
another spacecraft, they serve to illustrate the mindset of on-orbit servicing.  For more
information on these servicing missions, as well as others, see Lamassoure, 2001.      
Unmanned servicing of unmanned spacecraft
Although it was deemed to be cost-effective to use astronauts to service both the SMM
spacecraft and HST, most satellites would be less expensive to replace than the cost of a
manned servicing mission.  Thus, to become a more viable option, servicing needs to be
performed by an unmanned spacecraft.  Several studies have been performed to examine
the feasibility and cost-effectiveness of this type of satellite servicing. 
Studies on on-orbit upgrading
The Space Assembly, Maintenance, and Servicing (SAMS) project was funded by the
Department of Defense, Strategic Defense Initiative Office, and NASA to determine cost-
effective SAMS capabilities to meet requirements for improving space systems
capability, flexibility, and affordability. 
The Spacecraft Modular Architecture Design (SMARD) study examined the
serviceability of currently designed spacecraft, suggested alternatives to the design to
enable servicing, and examined the cost-effectiveness of particular servicing cases
(Davinic, 1997). 
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Upgrading the GPS constellation using autonomous on-orbit servicing has also been
studied.  One of the studies considered necessary structural modifications to the GPS
satellites to enable servicing (Hall, 1999).  The other performed a trade study to
determine the best servicing architecture (Leisman, 1999).
The SAMS, SMARD, and GPS studies researched the cost-effectiveness of servicing
from the perspective of using upgrades or functional replacements to avoid satellite
replacement.  For a top-level description of each of these studies, see Lamassoure, 2001
and Saleh, 2001.
Studies on value of flexibility of on-orbit servicing
One of the many benefits servicing provides is flexibility to adapt to future needs.  This
flexibility has significant value.  Two studies have been performed in this area to propose
frameworks for valuing flexibility.  One of the primary contributions of both of these
studies is their focus on the potential servicing client and how the client values servicing,
as opposed to how much the servicing architecture costs.
The first examines the value of flexibility as it relates to both commercial and military
systems.  The commercial valuation of flexibility deals primarily with the option for life
extension using upgrades on orbit.  The military valuation deals primarily with options to
relocate satellites as an alternative to global coverage  (Lamassoure, 2001).
The second study suggests an evaluation process to account for the flexibility inherent in
on-orbit servicing.  This real options-based framework examines the value of flexibility
for satellite life extension and relocation (Saleh, 2001).
2.4.2 Current servicing program:  Orbital Express
As the U.S. government is increasingly recognizing the potential advantages offered by
on-orbit servicing, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is
currently sponsoring the Orbital Express Space Operations Architecture, whose goal is to
study and demonstrate autonomous techniques for on-orbit servicing.  The program
intends to develop and demonstrate techniques for autonomous on-orbit refueling and
reconfiguration. 
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To demonstrate these techniques, an Autonomous Space Transporter and Robotics
Orbiter (ASTRO) servicing spacecraft will be used to conduct docking, refueling, and
pre-planned product improvement (“P3I”) operations.  In addition to the servicing
spacecraft itself, studies are being performed for the development of on-orbit storage and
handling of liquid and/or gaseous consumables5.
                                               
5
 For more information on Orbital Express see http://www.darpa.mil/tto/programs/astro.html.
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Chapter 3.   Valuation:  Interface
Between Technology and Economics
3.1 Introduction
This chapter serves to introduce a new valuation framework, which accounts for the
economics, technology, and flexibility associated with a project.  First, a discussion of
why a new valuation technique is important is presented.  Next, the new valuation
framework is discussed.  Finally, the steps to apply the framework for valuation is
presented.
3.2 Why are new valuation techniques necessary?
Current valuations fail in three major respects.  First, they do not generally aid in the
process of determining what the best product is from the perspective of providing value
to the client and the provider.  Second, they lack the ability to take into account both the
economic and technological aspects of a project.  Third, they neglect to quantitatively
account for flexibility in a project.  Each of these failures will be discussed below.
3.2.1 Doing the Right Job
The Lean Aerospace Initiative (LAI) is dedicated to improving the practices of the
aerospace industry.  The Product Development team, in particular, focuses on the “fuzzy”
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front-end development of a project.  One of the fundamental principles the team uses is
“Doing the right job and doing the job right.” 
Frequently on projects, there is a strong focus on doing the job right.  That may be by
applying lean principles or by other means particular to a group or company.  However,
“doing the job right” means nothing if the program is doing the wrong job.  For instance,
a program can be internally lean and well managed, but if the program is producing a
product for which there is little or no market, it does not matter how well it is run. 
Current valuations in aerospace tend to focus on valuing a point-designed product.  This
does not necessarily lead to doing the “right job.” Instead it may lead to doing a
reasonable job, but not necessarily the best one.  An important part of a good valuation is
to aid in determining what the “right job” is.  The “right job” is the one that provides the
most value to the client and provider.  Generally, these two things are highly correlated.
The more value the provider provides to her client, the more the client is willing to pay,
thus providing value for the provider.
3.2.2 Economics and Technology in Valuations
One of the fundamental drawbacks of current valuation techniques is that they do not
properly account for both economic and technical aspects associated with a given project.
To understand why this is true it is important to understand the background of the people
who perform these valuations.
Engineers
Technological products are developed by engineers.  As a stakeholder in the project, an
engineer’s primary goal is generally to solve a technical problem.  This can lead to
several difficulties in the process of valuing a project.  First, engineers generally lack an
understanding of economics and the potential market for their product.  Second,
engineers can get wrapped up in the technical aspects of their project and tend to neglect
the dynamics of its potential market value by assuming a market for their product exists. 
Finance/Marketing
The group of people that are typically the most involved with financial project valuation
are the finance and marketing employees of a firm.  Although this group may have a
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good understanding of economics and markets, they lack technical understanding of the
project.  This can lead to several issues.  First, they may promise a client something that
is technologically unfeasible; given the amount the client is willing to pay for the
product.  Second, there may be a way to adapt certain technologies to a market, but
without a solid technical background it is difficult to understand the best approach to
adapting current or future technologies to meet the needs of a given market.
Combining the two groups
Although the most successful valuations contain inputs from both engineering and
finance groups, combining these two groups is not trivial.  The problem here lies in that
the two groups often speak different languages.  The best way to solve this issue is to
include people in the valuation who have a solid technical and business background.
This provides an interface between the two groups, which will tend to produce more
accurate valuations.
3.2.3 Valuing Flexibility
As discussed in Section 2.3.4, there are often options associated with projects.  In current
valuations, these options are often overlooked. 
In fact, strategically important projects often fail internal financial tests.  Analysts,
in a quest to justify their “gut feel,” tend to manipulate the evaluation process,
raising cash flow forecasts to unlikely levels.  Key managers make decision
colored by optimism and bounded by their degree of risk aversion (Amram,
1999).
Current valuation techniques often lead to the wrong answer and generally undervalue
technologies because they lack the ability to value flexibility (Boer, 1998).  Flexibility
has value, especially in situations with high uncertainty.
One means of valuing flexibility is to use real options.  For a complete discussion of the
types of flexibility imbedded in projects and how to use real options to value them, see
Section 2.3.  For a complete discussion on the merits of flexibility as it applies to
aerospace products, see (Saleh, 2001).
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3.3 Valuation Framework
A new valuation framework is presented to address the issues of doing the right job,
accounting for economic and technical aspects, and the value of flexibility in a potential
project.  The three primary aspects of the framework are economics, technology, and the
interface between them.  Flexibility and determining the right job are also included in the
framework.  A visual representation of the framework is presented in Figure 3-1.
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Figure 3-1  Valuation Framework
Each of the aspects of the framework is discussed below.
3.3.1 Economics
When a space system is developed, it is easy to get consumed with the technology and
forget that the system must provide value to a potential client for the client to be willing
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to pay for it.  After the conceptual idea for a service/product is developed, it is important
to look at the idea from the perspective of a potential client to determine not only what
the service should be, but also what the potential client is willing to pay for it.
The left side of Figure 3-1 demonstrates some of these important aspects of a valuation.
Often, similar kinds of service can be provided using different approaches, with each of
these approaches providing a different value to the potential client.  The various means of
providing service should be investigated to determine how much value each approach
provides to the potential client. 
The reason the value provided to the client is important is because this value determines
the price they are willing to pay for the service and also gives an indication of which is
the best approach to providing the service.  Although there are many other drivers of the
price the market will bear, the primary drivers of this price are the direct economic
benefits the service provides the client and the value of flexibility the service provides.
Projects often fail because incorrect assumptions are made about potential markets.
These include assuming that the market is willing to pay the cost of the service plus some
profit margin and assuming that the current market is static, in that there will not be any
new competition or other technology developments.  These assumptions can lead to large
losses for the provider.
It is certainly possible that the service may not be worth the cost plus profit margin of the
system to the potential client.  In this case, the provider will receive little to no revenues
and will not cover the costs of the system, much less generate a profit. The possibility of
not having any or enough clients should provide adequate incentive to examine the
benefits of the service to the potential client to determine what value it provides them.
It is also possible that there are other means of providing service for the potential market,
which result in competition.  It is crucial to realize this when considering the price the
market is willing to pay for the potential service.  If the competition can provide
equivalent or greater value for the same or lower price, then it would be very difficult to
provide a valuable service the market. 
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3.3.2 Technology
Most aerospace companies are very familiar with the technology side of the framework.
Solving technical problems is what engineers do best.  However, it is important to realize
that in depth technical analysis is expensive and should not be undertaken with the
assumption that a market for the technology will exist.  Instead, the knowledge from
preliminary studies of the technology should be used to estimate costs and aid in
determining the economic and technical feasibility of meeting the market’s needs before
a detailed technical analysis is undertaken.
It is important to determine the primary technical risks in design and on-orbit operations
for each of the possible approaches to providing service.  The risks of design are
important to understand, as they can significantly impact the development costs and
schedule.  The technical on-orbit risks are important to understand because they impact
the system design, in that unless a particular approach is highly valuable to the potential
client, the client will be unlikely to purchase a service or product that is high-risk.  The
risks on orbit can also have a significant impact on operations costs. 
3.3.3 Interface
Although the economics and technology aspects of the framework are extremely
important, the interface between the two is where the crucial information about the
feasibility of the market is determined.  The economics side of the framework provides
the potential client’s value for each of the potential service approaches.  The technology
side provides the costs and risk assessments for each of the potential approaches.  The
interface provides information on which service approach is most feasible by determining
the value each approach provides to the potential service provider and thus, how to best
adapt technologies to meet the needs of the market.
The interface between economics and technology uses the revenue and cost from the
economics and technology sides, respectively, along with the value of flexibility, to
determine the value of each service approach to the provider.  This leads to the proper
adapting of technology to meet the needs of the market.  The approach chosen many not
be the best from the perspective of the potential client, because the client’s “best” service
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may be too technically difficult or too expensive for the provider to provide.  By the same
token, the approach chosen may not be the least expensive for the provider to provide.
Instead, it will be the best mix between the two stakeholders; resulting in a space system
that provides value to both the potential client and provider.
3.4 Applying the Valuation Framework
The framework presented in Section 3.3 is a representation of the interface between
economics and technology, as it applies to valuations.  To demonstrate using this
framework for valuations, the process is broken into steps.  These steps are also the goals
of the valuation in that each step not only gains information that is necessary to complete
the overall valuation, but also gives other insights along the way.  The goals of the
valuation are to determine:
• If there is a potential market
• What the market wants
• The value of the service/product to potential clients
• How much will it cost for someone to provide service/product to meet market
needs
• The value of the project to the provider
The valuation framework applies to both services and products.  For example, it can be
used to value the satellite servicing market, as well as to value the production a new
satellite configuration.  For the sake of brevity, “service” is used in place of
“service/product” throughout the remainder of the chapter.
In the process of performing a valuation using this framework, it is necessary to perform
technical/economic trade studies to most effectively meet the goals of the valuation.  One
of the primary benefits of the valuation is the technical and economic information gained
in the process of performing these trades.  This, along with each of the steps in the
valuation is discussed throughout the remainder of Section 3.3.
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3.4.1 Is there a potential market?
The first step in the valuation process is to determine if there is a potential market.  It is
necessary to consider several things to do this. 
• What is currently available to the potential client? 
• How much value does the current service provide to the client?
• What is the current competition?  What value do they provide?
• Are there any possible competitors in the future that can provide equivalent or
greater value to the client?
• What are the different possible services that can be provided to enhance the
value to the potential client?
The information gained from the questions above fall nicely into a trade study, with each
case representing a different means of providing service including the current services,
future competition, and potential services.  The purpose of the trade study is to determine
if the potential service is more valuable to the client than the current or possible
competition services.  The trade study should take into account the technical and
economic implications of each of the potential services in question.  It should also
include the valuation of flexibility (i.e. options) that each service provides.  The key is to
focus on the client and the value provided to them by each service.  The cost of the
service itself need not be taken into account, as that will be determined and accounted for
later in the valuation.  However, the cost of the client’s assets, i.e. her satellite, should be
accounted for.
Performing a trade study to explore the market viability, from the perspective of the
client, requires the use of both technical and economic inputs.  Although some of the
inputs may significantly impact the outputs of the study, many of them may not.  It is
important to recognize the difference between inputs that affect the answer and those that
do not.  Finding accurate inputs can often be time consuming and resources intensive.
Thus, knowing which inputs must be very accurate to produce accurate results is very
important.   Performing a sensitivity analysis on the trades model can be helpful in
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determining what level of accuracy for each input is necessary.  This applies to the inputs
for all trades performed throughout the valuation process.
3.4.2 What does the market want?
Using the information from the trade study discussed above, it is possible to gain a good
understanding of what the market wants.  This is based on what provides the most value
to the potential client.  As this was one of the purposes of the trade study, this
information is readily available.  It is important, at this stage in the valuation, to not focus
solely on one potential service (unless there are no alternatives).  As the costs of
providing each of the potential services have not been calculated, it is not clear if it is
possible to provide a particular service even if it provides the most value to the potential
client.  Therefore, alternatives must be examined as they may have different cost
characteristics.
Determining what the market does not want is just as important as determining what the
market wants.  If a potential service provides less value to the client than existing services
or potential competition, then this service will not provide additional value to the market.
Thus, it can be dismissed and the work of continuing the valuation of that particular
service can be avoided.
3.4.3 What is the value of the service to the client?
The purpose of this part of the valuation is to determine how much a potential client is
willing to pay, regardless of how much it costs, and how large the market is for each
potential service.  This implies the revenue stream of the potential service provider. 
The amount that a potential client is willing to pay for a service is dependent upon the
value it provides them.  If the service is a replacement for current services or products,
then the price they are willing to pay is a percentage of the value that it provides them.  If
the service is in addition to current services or products its value is simply the additional
value it provides over the current service.
As the client’s value for the service is already estimated in the trade studies, estimating
what the client is willing to pay is simply a matter of comparing the service to current and
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competition services and estimating what percentage of the client’s value for the service
they are willing to pass on to the service provider.  Although this percentage may be hard
to estimate, a sensitivity analysis to this number can be utilized to see how it affects the
final provider value.
In addition to the price the client is willing to pay, one needs to know how many clients
there are to determine the revenue stream.  Determining the market size requires making
an estimation of potential clients.  In the case of space systems, there are many available
forecasts for launches and satellites (Commercial Space Transportation Forecasts, 2001). 
3.4.4 How much will it cost to provide service?
After the revenue stream for the provider for each potential service is determined, the
costs of each potential service must be examined to see if the service costs less to provide
than the price the client is willing to pay.  The costs should include development costs
and production or operating costs (depending on whether it is a product or service that is
being provided).
3.4.5 What is the value of the project to the provider?
Now that the revenues and costs are known, finding the value of providing the service is
a matter of using these numbers and accounting for flexibility in the project.6   Just as
determining the value to the client forces the use of trade studies to determine the best
way of serving the client, determining the value to the provider of providing the service
forces the use of trades. 
This is the final part of the valuation and determines if the market is viable.  If the
servicing provider’s total present value for providing the service is negative, they will
choose not to provide the service.
                                               
6
 For a more in depth discussion of valuing flexibility and the different types of flexibility or options
available see Section 2.3.
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3.4.6 Learning by applying the valuation framework
In the course of applying the framework and attempting to predict the value of a
particular project, one will inevitably gain insights into many of the interactions between
the economics and technology, client and provider values, and design trades and
flexibility.  Equally as important, if not more so, as the final “answer” in the valuation
model is the information gained during the process. 
Trying to value a project is like climbing a mountain.  Although getting to the top, i.e.
coming up with an “answer”, is important, the climbing process and lessons learned
along the way are equally, if not more, important. 
In the case of space systems, many important insights are gained during the valuation
process.  For example, people’s perception of the risk involved with developing and
operating a novel system are more clearly understood after the valuation process is
performed.  This information is very useful in determining how much effort (marketing,
studies, etc.) is necessary to convince a potential client of the technical feasibility of the
project. 
The primary objective of a climb is generally to reach the summit.  There are many
reasons for this; one of which is to see the view.  The view from the summit depends on
where the climber looks and who the climber is.  There may not even be a view,
depending on the weather.  If the view is not clear, does that mean that the climb is
pointless?  Of course not.  The climber had to go through essentially the same process of
getting to the summit, as she would have on a day with a beautiful view.
Similarly, when performing a valuation, the goal is often to get “the” answer.  Just as
there are many different views from the top of a mountain, there are many different ways
of interpreting a valuation.  What one sees is generally dependent on who one is.  In
addition, the answer may not be as clear as one would like it to be.  Is all lost?  No.  The
information gained along the way exists regardless of the clarity of the answer. 
Although it is very exciting (and generally exhausting) to reach the summit of a
mountain, all good climbers recognize that summiting is not the end of a climb.  The
climber must be able to use the information gained on the ascent to guide her down the
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mountain. In a valuation, getting the answer is not the end of the process either.  One
must interpret the results and perform sensitivity analysis to determine the relative
significance of particular inputs.
3.4.7 Valuation Framework Flowchart 
The valuation framework presented above is used throughout the remainder of this thesis
to evaluate the satellite servicing market.  Much of the previous research in the field of
on-orbit servicing focuses on the cost benefit of specific types of servicing (Davinic,
1997) and (Leisman, 1999).  Although this is an important aspect of the economic
picture, it is certainly not the entire picture.  The cost benefit approach is solely the
supply-side.  The demand-side must be examined as well, to determine if there is a
potential servicing market.  Figure 3-2 shows a scenario in which the demand for
servicing is lower than the cost of servicing, which makes the market unviable.   


Figure 3-2  Example of Scenario Where Servicing Market is Not Feasible.

# of Satellites Serviced
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e
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No price for which
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This is only one example of how the supply and demand curves do not cross.  It is not
meant to be a representation of the actual supply and demand curves for the servicing
market.  Rather, it is presented to illustrate that one must examine the demand of a
market, as well, to determine its viability.
The flow of the valuation analysis is presented in Figure 3-3.  Its setup is derived from
both the valuation framework and the need to examine the project from the prospective of
both the client and provider.    
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Figure 3-3  Flowchart for Valuations
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Chapter 4 presents the client value analysis by analyzing the current, future competition,
and potential services to determine the value to the client of each case.  Chapter 5
presents the provider value analysis by using the information gained in Chapter 4 to
investigate the necessary architecture and value of each potential service.
3.5 Conclusions
A new valuation technique is necessary because current techniques neglect to address
many important aspects of a technical project.  First, they do not generally take into
account both the economics and technical aspects of a project by considering both the
potential client and provider perspectives.  Second, they do not quantitatively consider
the value of flexibility.  Third, by neglecting the first two aspects, valuations do not aid in
the determination of the “right” service approach.  Part of the reason that many current
valuations are flawed is because of the lack of understanding that engineers tend to have
of economics and that finance/marketing employees tend to have of technology. 
This chapter introduced a new valuation framework, which uses the economic, technical,
and flexibility aspects of a project to determine the best means of adapting technology to
meet the needs of a market.  The framework stresses the necessity of examining a
potential market from the perspective of both the potential client and the provider. 
By examining the market from the perspective of the two primary stakeholders, the client
and the provider, it is possible to determine the best service approach to provide the
greatest value for both the potential client and the provider.  An additional bonus to
performing the valuation using the framework presented in this chapter is that it forces
the use of trade studies, which provides many opportunities for learning about the
technological, economic, and flexibility aspects of a project, as well as the interface
between these three.    
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Chapter 4.   Satellite Servicing:
Client Value Analysis
4.1 Introduction
A satellite servicing analysis is presented in this chapter.  The primary purpose of this
chapter is to establish the viability, or lack thereof, of the commercial GEO satellite
servicing/refueling market from the client’s perspective.  The chapter begins with the
purpose of the study, and then moves on to the overall structure of the analysis.  The
analysis is broken down into several cases, each examining the viability of a different
servicing configuration.  Each of the servicing cases is presented individually.  Finally,
the cases are presented together and each of the cases is discussed in terms of its technical
risk.
4.2 Purpose
The client value analysis, when completed, serves as the primary input for the provider
value analysis, which in this instance is the valuation of the satellite servicing market.  In
order to determine the value of this market, it is first necessary to determine what the
client gains economically by using servicing.  This drives the price the client, henceforth
referred to as the client, is willing to pay for servicing and the size of the market.  If the
economic benefit to the client is large, it is likely that more clients will use servicing.  If
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the economic benefit is small, it is likely that a smaller number of clients will be willing
to undertake the added risk of servicing.
A thorough analysis of the economic benefit of servicing to the client must include the
full spectrum of possible alternatives – that is, different means of servicing and the
corresponding economic payoffs to the client.
For the purpose of this analysis, servicing is defined as the replenishment of consumables
(refueling) and/or the use of another spacecraft to aid in performing maneuvers.  
The purpose of this analysis is to determine:
• The economic benefit to a client of having his/her satellite serviced using several
servicing approaches
• The highest-value servicing approach for the client
By fulfilling the goals above, the analysis de-couples the costs and benefits of servicing
to determine if there is any economic benefit to clients of having their satellites serviced.
If there is not, then no commercial market for servicing exists.  If, on the other hand,
there is an economic benefit to the client, that benefit is quantified.  Thus, the client value
analysis determines the viability of the commercial GEO satellite servicing market. 
All other factors being equal, a satellite owner, henceforth called the client, would be
willing to pay a percentage of the benefit they gain from servicing to the servicing
provider.  Thus, once the benefit to the client is determined, an estimate of how much she
is willing to pay to have her satellite serviced can be found.  This estimate can then be
compared to the cost if servicing to see if an economically viable price exists.  It can also
be used as a cost constraint measure for design of the designated servicing architecture.
The provider’s perspective and costs of servicing are presented in the next chapter.
4.3 Approach
When determining the economic viability of a technical market, it is important to
recognize that the economic and technical aspects of the project are not mutually
exclusive.  This analysis takes into account both of these aspects by examining the major
spacecraft configuration changes associated with each servicing approach and tying it to
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their respective financial rewards and penalties.  The analysis also includes a description
of the technical risk associated with each case. 
It is also important to trade proposed systems against current systems and possible future
competition.  Thus, this analysis examines both satellites that use servicing and satellites
that do not.  The satellite servicing cases are labeled AQR  #, where # indicates the case
number.  The satellites that do not use servicing include the baseline satellite case –
Program A - and possible sources of competition, labeled Comp #.  The baseline, AQR,
and Comp cases are traded against each other.  The final trade is based upon economic
benefit provided to the client and the consideration of risk. 
An underlying assumption to this analysis is that the client’s goal is to maximize profits.
In the simplest form, profits are a function of revenue and expenses. 


Figure 4-1  Means of Increasing Profit

Thus, there are effectively two means of profit maximization:  reduce expenses and/or
increase revenue.
 This leads to the approach taken in the analysis in which both of these options are
pursued.  The most effective means of reducing expenses is to reduce the cost of launch.
The first two servicing cases use this approach, by reducing the mass of the spacecraft,
thus allowing for the possibility of either putting two spacecraft on one launch vehicle or
simply using a smaller, less expensive launch vehicle. 
Revenue Expense Profit
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The other servicing cases take the approach of increasing revenue.  This is accomplished
by adding more revenue generating transponders to the spacecraft.  Although this
increases the cost of the spacecraft, the analysis is used to determine if the increased
revenue compensates for these increased costs.  The baseline and servicing cases are
listed below in Table 4-1.  The competition cases are listed in Table 4-2.
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Table 4-1  GEO Servicing and Baseline Configuration Cases
Case Servicing
Task
Initial
Orbit
Propulsion  Configuration
Approach
Baseline
(Program A)
None  GTO7  Standard Biprop  Current s/c design
AQR 1 Fuel 1-Time
at Staging
Orbit for OR8
and SK 
Staging9  Standard Biprop
(launched dry)
Reduced Launch
Cost
1a:  2 s/c, 1 LV
1b: Cheaper LV
AQR 2 Tug for OR
and NSSK
Staging Biprop used
only for EWSK
and contingency
2a:  Reduced
Launch Cost
2b:  Additional
Transponders
AQR 3 Tug for NSSK GEO Biprop used
only for EWSK
and contingency
Additional
Transponders

AQR 4 Refuel before
each NSSK
maneuver
GEO Refuelable
Biprop Tanks
Additional
Transponders
AQR 5 “Optimal Just
in Time”
Refueling
GEO Refuelable
Biprop Tanks
Additional
Transponders
AQR 6 Tug for OR Staging OR: Biprop
SK: Electric
Propulsion
6a:  Reduced
Launch Cost 
6b:  Additional
Transponders
AQR 7 Tug for NSSK Staging Use Separable
Biprop Apogee
Stage for OR
Additional
Transponders
AQR 8 Fuel 1-Time
at Staging
Orbit for OR 
Staging OR: Biprop
SK:  Electric
Propulsion
Reduced Launch
Cost or
Additional
Transponders
                                               
7
 The Geosynchronous Transfer Obit used has perigee at 200 km altitude (radius 6578 km), apogee at
35786 km altitude (radius 42164 km or geosynchronous radius) and inclination of approximately 27.5
degrees.

8
 OR is orbit raising, SK is stationkeeping, and NSSK is North-South Stationkeeping.
9
 The staging orbit is circular at 10600 km altitude (radius about 17000 km) and inclination is 28.5 degrees.
It is utilized to minimize fuel consumption of the on orbit servicing architecture.
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Table 4-2  GEO Competition Cases
Case Initial Orbit Propulsion Configuration
Approach
Comp 1 GEO SK: Electric
Propulsion
Additional
Transponders
Comp 2 GTO OR and SK: Electric
Propulsion
Additional
Transponders
Comp 3 GEO Use Biprop for
Stationkeeping
Additional
Transponders
Comp 4 Staging Use Separable
Biprop Apogee
Stage for OR and
Biprop for SK
Additional
Transponders

Because satellite servicing represents a complete paradigm shift in the commercial
satellite market, the assumption in made that it is necessary to completely redesign a
spacecraft to optimize spacecraft for servicing.  This analysis does not explicitly examine
what the new configuration should be; rather it assumes that the same major limitations
placed on spacecraft today will still hold in the future.  (i.e. mass and volume will
continue to be limited)  These limitations are primarily dictated by the capacity of launch
vehicles and are not expected to change dramatically in the timeline of this potential new
market.
4.3.1 Important Technological Aspects of Each Case
One important aspect of each case that must be considered is its technological
implications, as they relate to the economic viability of the market. 
AQR 1
This case requires a servicing vehicle to dock with and fuel the spacecraft one time on
orbit.  From a technological standpoint, this case is associated with the least amount of
risk because docking and refueling are only required a single time over the lifetime of the
spacecraft.  In addition, this docking and refueling is performed at a time when there is no
risk of interrupting the client spacecraft’s services to its clients.
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AQR 2
This case requires a servicing vehicle to tug the spacecraft from the staging orbit to GEO
and then provide stationkeeping tugs approximately every 41 days.  From a technological
standpoint, using a tug vehicle instead of refueling reduces the risk each time the servicer
and client dock because no fluid transfer takes place. 
However, using a tug vehicle makes the client spacecraft completely reliant upon the
servicing vehicle because the client spacecraft has a very limited supply of contingency
fuel on-board, which cannot be refueled.  In addition, the frequent dockings
(approximately 134 times over the lifetime of the spacecraft) are performed while the
client spacecraft is providing service to its own clients.  Docking has to be performed in
such a way as to maintain the client spacecraft’s ability to provide service to its client,
which a nontrivial issue.
AQR 3
This case requires a launch vehicle to insert the client spacecraft directly into GEO and a
servicing spacecraft to provide stationkeeping tug maneuvers approximately every 41
days.  There is increased risk associated with direct-GEO insertion (DGI), as opposed to
launching to a lower orbit: the launch vehicle may under-perform.  However, the client
spacecraft has a docking mechanism on it, which would allow for a tug vehicle to tug the
client to the correct orbit, if the launch vehicle does under perform.  As discussed above,
from a technological standpoint, using a tug vehicle instead of refueling reduces the risk
each time the servicer and client dock because no fluid transfer takes place. 
However, several issues presented in AQR 2 apply to AQR 3 as well: client spacecraft is
completely reliant upon the servicing vehicle, and docking is performed while the client
is providing services. 
AQR 4
This case requires a launch vehicle to insert the client spacecraft directly in GEO and a
servicing spacecraft to refuel the client for stationkeeping approximately every 41 days.
This case has the same risks, presented in AQR 3, associated with DGI and reliance upon
a servicer.  However, the client spacecraft is slightly less reliant on the servicer because it
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has contingency fuel that can be replenished if it is used for an emergency.  In addition to
the risks discussed in AQR 3, the AQR 4 spacecraft is refueled, which adds the risk of
fluid transfer on orbit. 
AQR 5
This case requires a launch vehicle to insert the client spacecraft directly in GEO and a
servicing spacecraft to refuel the client for stationkeeping approximately 12 times over
the lifetime of the client spacecraft.  This case has the same risks, presented in AQR 3,
associated with DGI and being reliant upon a servicer.  However, the client spacecraft is
much less reliant on the servicer because it is refueled much less frequently and has
contingency fuel that can be replenished if it is used for an emergency.  In addition to the
risks discussed in AQR 3, the AQR 5 spacecraft is refueled, which adds the risk of fluid
transfer on orbit.
AQR 6
This case requires a servicing vehicle to tug the spacecraft from the staging orbit to GEO
and then the client spacecraft provides its own stationkeeping using electric propulsion.
As the servicing provided only requires docking one time on orbit before the client
spacecraft begins service to its clients, the risk associated with the servicing is minimal
compared to the other cases.  Using electric propulsion (EP) for stationkeeping is a less
utilized technology than using bipropellant, which may slightly increase its risk.
However, EP has been successfully utilized on spacecraft for many years, specifically in
Russia.  (Wertz and Larson, 1999).
AQR 7
The idea behind the case is to launch a separable apogee stage to the staging orbit on a
less expensive launch vehicle (the Long March), where it docks with the client spacecraft
to perform its orbit raising.  Once in GEO, the apogee stage separates and the client
spacecraft uses a tug vehicle for NSSK.  Unfortunately, adding the cost of an additional
launch makes the case much more expensive than the other AQR cases, without
providing enough additional revenue to compensate for the increased costs.  Thus, after
the analysis, this case was discarded because it was uneconomical.
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AQR 8
This case was also discarded after the analysis, because it is severely limited by volume.
The case involves launching the spacecraft with an empty orbit raising fuel tank and
adding an electric propulsion system onboard.  However, the spacecraft does not provide
a cheaper launch because it is unable to fit into the smaller launch vehicle fairing of a
Delta 2 and is also too large to allow two spacecraft to fit into one Atlas IIAS fairing.  It
is also limited by volume in terms of adding additional transponders and launching a
single spacecraft on an Atlas IIAS.  It is limited to the point, where it is not comparable to
the other servicing cases.
Comp 1
This case requires a launch vehicle to insert the client spacecraft directly in GEO and the
spacecraft to provide for its own stationkeeping using electric propulsion.   As in some of
the other cases, there is an increased risk associated with DGI.  However, unlike the
servicing cases, if the launch vehicle under performs, this spacecraft does not have
docking abilities that would allow another spacecraft to perform any necessary orbit
raising maneuvers.  As discussed above, the use of electric propulsion for stationkeeping
adds minimal risk to the spacecraft.
Comp 2
This case requires a launch vehicle to launch the spacecraft to GTO and then the
spacecraft to perform all of its own orbit raising and stationkeeping using electric
propulsion.  The major issue with using electric propulsion for orbit raising is that it is
much slower than using bipropellant.  This causes two problems.  First, the spacecraft
effectively loses a month’s worth of revenue (the difference in time between using EP
and bipropellant) while it performs its orbit raising maneuvers.  This loss of a month of
service may cause other issues, as well.  For instance, the client could lose market share
because it is unable to begin servicing its clients earlier. 
In addition to the issues with the revenue stream, using EP for orbit raising exposes the
satellite to increased radiation as it passes through the Van Allen belts (Wertz and
Larson, 1999).  In order to compensate for this the spacecraft must utilize more radiation-
hardened materials, which increases the cost and mass of the spacecraft. 
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After considering the increased time to orbit and the increased radiation exposure, for the
purposes of this analysis, the AQR cases will only be compared to the Comp 1 spacecraft.
However, the Comp 2 detailed analysis is presented below for completeness. 
Comp 3
Comp 3 uses an Atlas IIAS to launch a spacecraft directly to GEO.  The spacecraft then
uses its own bipropellant propulsion system to perform all of the necessary
stationkeeping maneuvers on orbit.  This case is discarded because it is severely mass
limited, in terms of the number of additional transponders that can be added to the
spacecraft.  Using DGI reduces the mass the launch vehicle can handle and the biprop
propellant mass needed for stationkeeping also reduces the mass available to additional
transponders.  The mass limitation translates to revenue limitation, which makes the case
only slightly economically better than the baseline case and much worse than the EP
competition cases.  
Comp 4
Comp 4 is the same as AQR 7, except that the Comp 4 spacecraft performs its own
stationkeeping maneuvers, using its onboard biprop propulsion system.  As with the AQR
7 spacecraft, adding the cost of an additional launch makes the case much more
expensive than the other cases, without providing enough additional revenue to
compensate for the increased costs.   Thus, Comp 4 was discarded.
Discarded Cases
Although each case discussed above underwent the same analysis, the following section
does not present details for cases that were discarded due to either economic or technical
issues.   
4.3.2 Transforming the Baseline Satellite to the Case
Configurations
To determine the value of each case, each trade begins with a baseline satellite.  The
baseline satellite represents a commercial GEO satellite designed and built by Space
Systems/LORAL (SS/L).  The baseline satellite will be referred to as Program A.  The
quantitative technical and cost information used in this analysis is representative of
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typical spacecraft designs but does not precisely reflect any specific SS/L design in order
to protect SS/L proprietary data.
The initial part of each trade is broken into four areas.  These areas are mass, volume,
launch vehicle and spacecraft cost, and revenue.  The mass, volume, and spacecraft costs
are based upon Program A data and data from similar programs.  The approach is to
determine the changes in these areas associated with each trade configuration.   Various
spacecraft components are subtracted from or added to the baseline satellite in order to
“transform” into the appropriate configuration. 
After the appropriate parts are subtracted or added to the baseline satellite to form the
serviced or competition satellite, the additional volume and mass available for additional
transponders is examined.  It is necessary to determine if volume or mass is the limiting
factor in terms of the number of additional transponders that can be added to the
spacecraft.  Once the number of additional transponders is calculated, the additional cost
and revenue associated with the additional transponders are added to the total cost and
total yearly revenue for the satellite.  A discounted cash flow analysis is then used to
determine the net present value (NPV), before options, of the satellite case.  This NPV is
the value of the satellite before the flexibility of servicing is taken into account.   The
value of the option for life extension is then calculated and summed with the NPV to get
the total present value of the configuration.  The flow chart for this analysis structure is
shown below, in Figure 4-2.
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Figure 4-2  Flow-chart for Analysis of Each Case
As there are many different definitions of flexibility, it is important to define the way it is
being used in this analysis.  For the purpose of this study, flexibility is defined as the
ability of a spacecraft to adapt, on-orbit, to changes in its initial requirements and
Total
Cost
Baseline  Satellite
VolumeMass RevenueCost
Limiting Factor
Analysis Spacecraft Launch
Additional
Transponders
Total S/C
and LV Cost
Additional
Cost
Additional
Revenue
Total
Revenue
Discounted
Cash Flow
Net Present Value Before Options Option  for Life Extension
Total  Present Value
 67
objectives.  For example, the ability to use servicing to extend the life of a serviced
spacecraft is considered flexibility.
Value is another widely used term, which has many different definitions.  Value is
defined here as economic benefit.  In this chapter, it is the economic benefit to the client.
The total value, after flexibility is taken into account, is the theoretical upper limit of the
amount that the client is willing to pay to have their satellite serviced.
In order to determine the “true” value of servicing, one must take into account the value
of flexibility.  The two aspects of flexibility discussed in this analysis are the flexibility
for life-extension and the flexibility to maneuver a satellite on-orbit to capture a different
market.  The value of flexibility is added to the value of servicing before flexibility to
determine the client’s total present value of servicing.
After the value of each case is determined, the servicing cases and competition cases are
compared to each other to determine which trade provides the most value to the client. 
4.3.3 Baseline Calculations for Subtraction or Addition of
Parts
The components that are added to or removed from the baseline satellite are different for
each case.  The components that are removed include fuel tanks, structural mass,
pressurant tanks, and propulsion capabilities.  The components that are added include fuel
tanks, fuel, docking and refueling mechanisms, pressurant tanks, and electric propulsion
components.  Each of these is discussed below.
Fuel Tanks
This analysis assumes biprop fuel is used for all maneuvers in the baseline and AQR
cases.  The Comp cases utilize electric propulsion.  The size and mass of the baseline
satellite fuel tanks is found using the mass and volume of fuel needed to perform orbit
raising maneuvers from a geosynchronous transfer orbit (GTO), North-South station-
keeping (NSSK), and East-West station-keeping (EWSK) maneuvers over the satellite’s
15-year on-orbit life.
The rocket equation is the primary equation used to size the fuel tanks:
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where the pre-maneuver spacecraft wet-mass is M0, the post-maneuver spacecraft mass is
M,  the specific impulse, Isp  = 310 s for orbit raising (OR) and Isp  = 292 s for
stationkeeping maneuvers , the standard mean acceleration of gravity on earth, g = 9.8
m/s2, and ∆v is in m/s and varies with the maneuver performed.  Since
UsedFuelMMM +=0
it is straightforward to find the mass of the fuel used during a maneuver.  It is simply








−







 ∆
= 1
sp
Fuel gI
vExpMM
Using the rocket equation with ∆v = 1800 m/s for orbit raising maneuvers, the following
ratio is found:
8.1=
BOL
GTO
M
M

where MGTO is the mass of the spacecraft at geosynchronous transfer orbit and MBOL is
the mass of the spacecraft at the beginning of its life upon reaching geosynchronous orbit
(GEO).  Given that
BOLFuelRaisingOrbitGTO MMM +=
the mass of the fuel for orbit raising (OR) from geosynchronous transfer orbit is
.8.0 BOLORFuel MM =
In addition to the orbit raising fuel, the baseline satellite must carry fuel for NSSK and
EWSK maneuvers.   Using the rocket equation with ∆v = 750 m/s, for a 15 year lifetime,
and Isp  = 292 s,
EOLBOL MM 3.1=
where MEOL is the mass of the spacecraft at the end of its on-orbit life, which is
effectively the spacecraft dry mass.  Given that
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EOLFuelpingStationkeeBOL MMM +=
the mass of the stationkeeping (SK) fuel is
EOLSKFuel MM 3.0= .
Thus, the total fuel onboard is
( ) DryEOLEOLEOLTotalFuel MMMMM 34.134.13.03.18.0 ==+= .
Using a baseline dry mass of 1547 kg, MFuel Total = 2072 kg. The fuel tank mass can now
be calculated using
FuelTankFuel MM 029.0=
and the volume can be found using10
FuelTanksFuel Mfuelkg
mV 





=
30009.0
     
Fuel tank volume and mass are found for the other cases using the same basic method.
However, all of the serviced satellites are launched to the staging orbit, which requires
more fuel for OR maneuvers to GEO.  Using the above method, with ∆v = 2395 m/s, the
wet mass at staging is MSTG = 2.2MBOL, which leads to
BOLStagingfromORFuel MM 2.1= .
Where the method of fuel tank sizing differs significantly from that presented above, the
differences are outlined in the individual case sections. 
The cost of the fuel tanks is taken into account as well.  The costs of the various fuel tank
sizes are from company data.11
                                               
10
 The mass of the fuel tank per kg of fuel is an estimate from a propulsion engineer at Space
Systems/LORAL.
11
 The cost data is an estimate from a propulsion engineer at Space Systems/LORAL who is familiar with
fuel tank costs.
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Pressurant Tanks
A pressurant tank filled with helium is included in the “dry mass” of the baseline satellite.
This gas is included in the dry mass because it will not be refueled on orbit and thus must
be taken into account in the mass and volume that is launched into orbit.  This mass is
referred to as “dry” because it does not include the fuel mass. 
The mass and volume of the baseline pressurant tank are calculated because some of the
cases require a different size pressurant tank.  Thus, in order to calculate the new “dry”
mass it is necessary to subtract the standard baseline tank mass and volume and add the
mass and volume of the pressurant tank that is appropriate for the individual case. 
The Ideal Gas Law is used to calculate the volume of the baseline pressurant tank.
Recognizing that the helium must fill the volume of the fuel used for orbit raising at a
pressure of PFuel Tank  = 180 psi and the helium is stored at Phelium = 4000 psi,12  the volume
of the baseline pressurant tank is
( )( ) 3065.0 m
P
VP
V
TankHe
TankFuelofPortionORTankFuel
TankHeBaseline == .
The calculation of the pressurant tank for each case is shown in the individual case
sections.
Propulsion Systems
As mentioned above, the baseline case is a standard bipropellant propulsion system used
for both orbit raising and stationkeeping.  Each of the other cases has its own modified
propulsion system.  For example, in AQR 2, the satellite does not need orbit raising or
NSSK capabilities because these maneuvers are performed by a tug.  Thus, the parts of
the propulsion system that are specific to orbit raising are removed.  The redundant parts
specific to NSSK are removed as well.  The NSSK capability is not removed entirely
because that would significantly increase the risk of servicing.  The case specific
propulsion capability changes are discussed in the individual case sections.
                                               
12
 The tank pressure, along with information about the functionality of pressurant tanks, is an estimate from
a propulsion engineer at Space Systems/LORAL, who is familiar with both the baseline satellite and
satellite refueling.
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In addition to the changes made to the biprop cases, the electric propulsion cases are
discussed in more detail in each of their own sections.  As expected, use of electric
propulsion requires much larger modifications to the satellite propulsion system.
Docking and Refueling Mechanisms
In order to service a satellite, the satellite must have a method to interface with the
servicing satellite.  In the cases where the satellite is tugged, a redundant docking
mechanism is needed.  In the refueling cases, a redundant docking mechanism and
refueling interface are necessary.  The mass and cost of each of these items are taken into
account in the appropriate cases.   
Structural Savings
The baseline satellite configuration includes a central cylinder and other support
structures that serve to support the fuel tanks during the harsh launch environment.
When the satellite configuration is changed such that the fuel tanks are either removed or
minimized, much of this support structure is unnecessary.  Therefore, for each of the
cases, the estimated mass and cost of the unnecessary support structure is subtracted from
the baseline satellite mass and cost.13   The volume of removed support structure is
minimal and is neglected in this analysis.
4.3.4 Mass
The mass of the satellite is limited only by the capacity of the launch vehicle.  The launch
vehicle mass capacity for each of the cases is reduced from the baseline case because the
servicing cases utilize a different orbit.  Four of the servicing cases assume the spacecraft
is launched to a staging orbit.  This staging orbit is not the same as GTO.  The non-
standard staging orbit is necessary because it is an orbit in which minimal propulsion is
needed to maintain an on-orbit supply of fuel.  Since the servicing cases involving orbit
raising require fuel on orbit, whether it is used by the spacecraft itself or a tug vehicle, all
of them utilize the same staging orbit.  In addition to the satellites being launched to a
staging orbit, several of the cases involve direct GEO insertion (DGI), which reduces the
                                               
13
 The estimates in this analysis are from a satellite structures engineer at Space Systems/LORAL. 
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launch vehicle capacity even further.  The total mass capacity for launch is 85% and 76%
of the mass capacity to GTO, for spacecraft launched directly to staging and GEO,
respectively (Mission Planner’s Guide for Atlas Launch Vehicle Family, Rev. 5, 1995)
and (Turner, Ref. 2, 2000). 
The final result of the mass analysis is the extra mass available for payload. Ultimately,
this number along with the extra available volume determines the number of additional
transponders that can be added to the satellite. Taking the dry mass of Program A and
subtracting or adding components as necessary determines the extra mass.  For example,
if a satellite is going to be continually refueled, the standard fuel tanks, pressurant tank,
and some of the structural mass can be removed from the satellite.  In their place, smaller
fuel tanks, refueling and docking mechanisms and a smaller pressurant tank must be
included in the new configuration.  This subtraction and addition, along with the
constraint of launch vehicle capacity leads to a mass, which can be filled with revenue
generating transponders.
4.3.5 Volume
The volume calculations are only slightly more complicated than the mass calculations.
The same basic approach of subtraction or addition of parts is taken.  The difference lies
in that the volume of the baseline satellite is assumed to fill the launch vehicle fairing,
thus the launch vehicle volume capacity is not examined for each case individually.  It is
however, crucial to the case AQR 1, as this case tries to reduce the cost of launching the
satellite by either putting two spacecraft on one launch vehicle or one spacecraft on a
smaller, less expensive launch vehicle.  This requires redesign of the spacecraft, such that
it can utilize the entire volume of the fairing, including the upper cone-shaped section.
4.3.6 Spacecraft Cost
Spacecraft cost is taken into account by finding a cost for each case.  This is
accomplished by tracking the changes associated with each case and estimating their
corresponding increase or decrease in cost.  For each case, this cost and a (transponder
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cost) are then added to an assumed baseline cost of $95 M to find the total cost of the
new satellite.14  
Another important aspect to spacecraft cost is the cost of redesign.  As each of the cases
would require some level of redesign, this cost could have a significant impact on the
overall cost of the satellite.  The cost of redesign is assumed to be $40M or $60M, for the
cases where the number of transponders are decreased or increased from the baseline
case, respectively.15   The expected redesign cost for each case is amortized over the
expected number of satellites that will utilize that particular servicing configuration.  It is
assumed that a maximum of one servicing configuration will be adopted, as the
infrastructures behind the various servicing options are very different, expensive, and
complex.
4.3.7 Launch Vehicle Cost
For many commercial GEO satellites, launch vehicle costs are approximately equivalent
the cost of the spacecraft itself.  The baseline launch vehicle in this study is the Atlas
IIAS. Although it is recognized that this launch vehicle will probably not be available
during the timeline that satellite servicing will be commercially available, the basic
launch technology and relative costs are believed to be remaining fairly constant
throughout this time period.  Thus, even if another launch vehicle is used in the future,
the relative costs are assumed to scale with the mass and volume capacity of the launch
vehicle, which allows a current launch vehicle to be used in this analysis.
The baseline launch cost is for an Atlas IIAS carrying one spacecraft to GTO.  This cost
is $97.5 M (Isakowitz, 1999).  This is simply an average of the low and high estimates for
the Atlas IIAS launch vehicle cost.  The Atlas IIAS was chosen as the baseline launch
vehicle for several reasons.  First, its mass limit to GTO is very close to the baseline
satellite mass.  This reduces the impact of excess launch vehicle mass capability on the
                                               
14
 The Program A cost is from a business development employee at Space Systems/LORAL who is familiar
with the actual cost of Program A.  This number is not the actual cost of the spacecraft, as that number is
proprietary, but is within $5 M.
15
 The redesign costs are estimates from a research and development employee as Space Systems/LORAL.
The employee is has extensive experience with redesigning satellites and the costs associated with redesign.
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number of additional transponders.   Second, it has a very high reliability (100% to date).
This minimizes the effect of launch risk on the analysis.
As the staging orbit is not a standard orbit for current launch vehicles, it is assumed that
the cost of the launch would be increased by 10%.  This increase in cost is assumed to
account primarily for increased costs in software.  In reality these costs would be a one-
time expense to the launch vehicle manufacturer, who would pass these costs on to the
client requesting an unconventional launch.  However, to remain conservative, a 10%
launch cost increase is included for all satellites launched to the staging orbit.  
No additional increase in cost is assumed for the cases that use one launch vehicle for two
spacecraft.  This is because the conservative approach of including a 10% launch cost
increase and using an average baseline cost, is assumed to properly account for any
additional expenses associated with adding an additional spacecraft to the launch vehicle.
4.3.8 Limiting Factor Analysis
The limiting factor analysis is used to determine the number of additional transponders
that can be added to the satellite in each case.  It begins with the additional volume and
mass generated by changing the satellite configuration.  The additional number of
transponders that can be added is calculated using the following:






=
 MassrTranspondelIncrementa
 MassAdditional
VolumerTranspondelIncrementa
VolumeAdditional
rsTransponde
Additional
,min

The incremental transponder volume is the additional volume associated with adding one
more transponder to the spacecraft.  This volume is the volume of the transponder itself,
as well as the volume for access, packaging, scaleable batteries, waveguide, and OMUX
(output multiplexer).16   Adding the volumes above, the incremental transponder volume
is 0.0227 m3.
The incremental transponder mass is the mass of all of the parts of the baseline satellite
that scale with the number of transponders divided by 48, the total number of
                                               
16
 The volume of each of these parts is from Space Systems/LORAL internal documents.
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transponders on the satellite.17   The incremental transponder mass used in this analysis is
27.45 kg.
4.3.9 Revenue and Cost Calculations
The calculations for the final revenue/year and cost of the spacecraft begin with the
baseline satellite revenue/year and cost.  As revenue and cost numbers are generally
proprietary, the numbers used are not exact numbers from Program A. 
Cost
The cost of the baseline spacecraft is assumed to be $95 M.  The launch cost for the
baseline satellite is $97.5 M.  This is the current cost of an Atlas IIAS launched to GTO
(Isakowitz, 1999).  This leads to a total baseline spacecraft and launch cost of $192.5 M.
In addition to the baseline cost, each case has an associated (spacecraft cost) (the
change in the cost due to adding and subtracting components and the cost of redesign), a
(launch cost) (the change in the launch cost due to using a non-standard orbit and/or
non-standard configuration), and the cost of adding additional transponders.  These costs
are summed to determine the total spacecraft and launch cost for each case.
The (spacecraft cost) is calculated by adding or subtracting the cost of components as
they are added or subtracted from the baseline satellite and accounting for the cost of
redesigning the spacecraft.   The costs of individual components, for example a fuel tank,
are generally very small in comparison to the other cost changes.  However, they are
included in the analysis for the sake of completeness.
Revenue
The baseline revenue/year is calculated as follows:
( )
MrstranspondeM
spacecraftbaselineonrstransponde
yrrTransponde
venue
yr
venue
8.103$4816.2$
#ReRe
=×=
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17
 The incremental mass is calculated using Space Systems/LORAL data from Program A.
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The revenue/transponder/year is from The London Satellite Exchange, an online market
place for the satellite industry, which sells capacity on spacecraft (“The London Satellite
Exchange”, 2001).  As each market values bandwidth differently (e.g. bandwidth over the
U.S. is generally more economically valuable than bandwidth over Africa) an average
over the globe is used.  In addition, the satellite exchange offers both C Band and Ku
Band capacity.  These numbers are averaged, as well.
 It is recognized that the servicing timeline is long and it is very probable that other bands
will be used by the time servicing is utilized.  For the purpose of this analysis, it is
assumed that the revenues will scale with costs in the future.
The total revenue/year for each case is calculated as follows:
( ) 
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
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
+=
rtransponde
M
rstranspondeadditionalrstransponde
Yr
venueTotal 16.2$48Re .
4.3.10 Discounted Cash Flow Analysis
After revenue and cost numbers are generated for each case the net present value (NPV)
for the case is calculated using a discounted cash flow (DCF).  The DCF analysis is a
realistic representation of the way current satellites are financed.18   The model includes
taxes, depreciation, debt and equity financing, interest expenses, and satellite operating
costs.  The model is set up such that the inputs are spacecraft revenue per year and total
cost of a spacecraft (including launch).  The model calculates the NPV based on a given
discount rate.  For the purposes of this study the following assumptions are made in the
analysis:
• Corporate tax rate = 40%
• Loan amount = 85% of cash needed
• Depreciation life = 15 years
• Cost of Debt = 10%
                                               
18
 The DCF model is a modified version of a model used by Space Systems/LORAL employees to
determine the viability of new projects.
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• Spacecraft and launch costs are distributed evenly over two years before launch
date
• Operating Expenses = 15% of gross revenue generated per year after launch
• Operating Expenses = $3 M/year for two years before launch
• Discount rate = 10% (this number is varied to show sensitivity to cost of capital)
For the baseline case the NPV is calculated using the above assumptions, a total cost of
$192.5 M, and revenue per year of $103.8 M.  The baseline NPV is $179.3 M.
4.3.11 Option to Extend Life of Satellite
An additional benefit to on-orbit servicing is that it provides the possibility of extending
the life of the satellite beyond its design lifetime.  Assuming the satellite is still
operational at the end of its lifetime and the market that it serves is still willing to pay for
its services, a tug or refueling spacecraft can be used to maintain the satellite’s orbit to
allow it to continue to generate revenues. 
It is recognized that some spacecraft would be unable to take advantage of this life
extension provided by servicing because either the spacecraft has already reached the end
of its useful life or the market it serves is not viable.  These are taken into account in the
following analysis by multiplying the value given by the equation below by the
percentage of spacecraft that would be operational and have a market available to them
after their 15-year lifetime.
The approach to determining the value of the option for life extension is to apply a
modified version of the Black-Scholes equation. (See Section 2.3.6)  As it applies to life
extension, the Black-Scholes equation is
( ) ( )210 0)( dNCEedNSV opsrTOPTION ×+×−×= −
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and
S0   = present value of revenue stream over life extension
r   = risk-free interest rate
E      = cost of servicing
Cops  = operating cost of spacecraft over life extension
T0     = time of servicing for life extension (i.e. design lifetime of satellite)

     = volatility of the revenues per year of (continuously compounded) rate of return
(Saleh, 2001)
Although each of the variables above is important in the options analysis, the value of the
option is more sensitive to some of the variables than others.  This is important because
the sensitivity of the final answer to each variable should determine the effort put into
finding accurate inputs for each of the variables.  Thus, a sensitivity analysis was
performed on the option value to determine which inputs need to be very accurate.  In the
range of reasonable inputs and values for this analysis, it was found that the value of the
option for life extension was sensitive to the length of life extension, which determines
S0; the risk-free interest rate; and the percentage of satellites that, if not limited by fuel,
are operational after their 15-year lifetime. 
The value of the revenue stream over the life extension, S0, is simply the revenue
generated per year by the satellite in question, multiplied by the length of life extension.
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The risk-free interest rate is 5.39% (“Federal Reserve Statistical Release”, 2002).  The
cost of servicing, E, is assumed to be the cost of delivery of the fuel to GEO using
Aquarius multiplied by the amount of fuel necessary to maintain the satellite’s orbit over
the length of time of life extension.  The cost of the servicing infrastructure is not
included, as it is accounted for in the cost of servicing over the design lifetime of the
satellite.  The operating cost of the spacecraft over the life extension is assumed to be
10% of revenues per year19.  The time of servicing, T0, is assumed to be 15 years.  The
volatility of the revenues per year is assumed to be 0.087 (Christodoulou, 2001). In
addition, the average life extension is assumed to be 2.5 years20.
In the appropriate cases (i.e. the cases that use either a tug or refueling) the equation
above is used to determine the option value.  As mentioned above, not all satellites will
be operational after their 15-year design lifetime, which means that not all spacecraft will
be able to take advantage of life extension.  As this must be reflected in the option value,
the value calculated above is multiplied by 70%, the percentage of satellites that are
expected to be operational after their design lifetime.21   The option value is then added to
the NPV for each case to determine the total value of servicing.
4.3.12 Flexibility to relocate satellite and capture other markets
Another advantage to servicing is that it gives the client the ability to maneuver its
spacecraft to cover other markets without shortening the useful lifetime of the spacecraft.
This flexibility has economic value because it allows the client spacecraft to adapt to
changing market conditions.  For example, market conditions today may indicate that
there is an economically viable market in Africa but a few years after beginning service
the market collapses, which significantly reduces the revenue stream for the owner of the
spacecraft.  However, there may be a market for the same services in Asia.  With the help
of a tug or refueling vehicle, the serviced satellite can relocate over the new market and
                                               
19
 This number is an estimate from a finance employee at Space Systems/LORAL, who performs financial
valuations.
20
 This number is an estimate from a systems engineering employee at Space Systems/LORAL.
21
 This number is an estimate from two independent sources at Space Systems/LORAL.
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continue to generate revenue without shortening its lifetime because it uses its limited
fuel supply to perform a fuel-intensive orbit maneuver. 
Although this flexibility has value and should be considered within the context of the
value of satellite servicing, assigning a dollar value to this flexibility for a general case is
not a trivial issue.  First, it is necessary to know which are the initial and possible final
markets.  This information is needed to determine the amount of fuel needed to maneuver
the spacecraft from the initial to final market.  In addition, the volatility of each of these
markets must be known as well as the probability that the possible final market will be
served by another satellite before the spacecraft in question utilizes the option to relocate
there.  As these numbers are associated with a particular satellite and not the general case,
this analysis should be performed by or for a specific client, in order to determine the
value of the option for relocation.
4.4 AQR 1:  Current Satellite Launched Dry
4.4.1 Description
This case examines the client’s perspective on the economic viability of launching a
slightly modified version of the baseline spacecraft, without fuel, to the staging orbit.
The spacecraft is fueled once at the staging orbit, with enough fuel to perform its OR
maneuvers and a lifetime of NSSK and EWSK maneuvers.  The approach to increasing
profit for AQR 1 is to reduce launch costs.  This is accomplished because the mass of the
dry spacecraft is such that two can be launched on the baseline launch vehicle or one can
be placed on a smaller, less expensive vehicle.  Thus, AQR 1 is broken down into AQR
1a and AQR 1b, two spacecraft on one launch vehicle and one spacecraft on a smaller
launch vehicle, respectively. As the calculations for both 1a and 1b are very similar, they
will be presented together throughout this section.
4.4.2 Mass
The mass of the serviced spacecraft is found by subtracting the mass of unnecessary
components and adding the mass of required components to the baseline spacecraft mass.
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Fuel Tanks
Although the serviced satellites in this case are essentially the baseline satellite launched
dry, it is necessary to re-size the fuel tanks in order to compensate for the increased fuel
needed to perform OR from the staging orbit.  The mass of the fuel needed for OR and
stationkeeping is
DryFuel MM 86.1=
where MDry is the dry mass of the spacecraft.  This dry mass is dictated by the capacity of
the launch vehicle.  Since AQR 1a and 1b use different launch vehicles, their dry masses
are different.  In AQR 1a, the launched dry mass of the satellite is half of the capacity of
the Atlas IIAS, after adapters are considered, which is 1480.6 kg.  This leads to a fuel
mass of 2754 kg and a fuel tank mass of
.80029.0 kgMM FuelTankFuel ==
The fuel tank mass for AQR 1b is found using the same method.  The dry mass of the
satellite is the launch capacity of the Delta 2/7295 to the staging orbit, which is 1588.7
kg.  This leads to a fuel tank mass of 86 kg.   
Pressurant Tanks
As with the fuel tanks, it is necessary to re-size the helium pressurant tanks for AQR 1a
and 1b to account for the increased fuel needed for OR from the staging orbit.  As with
the other components, the approach here is to subtract the baseline satellite pressurant
tank, which has a mass of 23 kg, and add the newly sized pressurant tanks.
The mass of a pressurant tank is proportional to its volume.  Thus, the volume of the
pressurant tank is calculated and the mass is found by linearly scaling it with the mass of
the baseline pressurant tank.  Since the helium is used only to pressurize the volume of
the fuel tank left empty after the orbit raising maneuvers are complete, the volume of the
helium tank can be found by using the Ideal Gas Law.  Therefore volume of the helium
tank is
( )( )
TankHe
FuelORTankFuel
TankHe P
VP
V = .
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The mass of the tank is found using
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This leads to pressurant tank masses of 33 and 35 kg for AQR 1a and 1b, respectively.
Propulsion System
As both the AQR 1a and 1b spacecraft use the same propulsion system as the baseline
satellite, it is not necessary to add or subtract components.  The mass of the propulsion
system remains the same.
Docking and Refueling Mechanisms
The AQR 1 satellites requires the capability to dock with and be refueled by a servicing
satellite. Thus, they need both a docking mechanism and a refueling mechanism.  The
redundant docking mechanism has a mass of 32 kg and the refueling mechanism has a
mass of 50 kg.  This leads to a mass addition of 82 kg to the baseline satellite.22 
Structural Savings
A mass savings is realized for the AQR 1 spacecraft because the central cylinder and
other associated structural parts do not need to support full fuel tanks during launch.
Thus, a savings of 20 kg is realized for both AQR 1a and 1b satellites.23 
Launch Vehicle Capacity
As both of the AQR 1 spacecraft are launched directly to the staging orbit, there is an
associated mass penalty.  The launch vehicle mass capacity to staging is 85% of the
capability to the baseline GTO.  The total mass capacity for Atlas IIAS to GTO is 3719
kg and the mass capacity for Delta 2/7295 to GTO is 1869 kg (Mission Planner’s Guide
for the Atlas Launch Vehicle Family, 1992) and (Delta II Payload Planners Guide, 2000).
In addition, using one launch vehicle for two spacecraft requires an additional launch
                                               
22
 These masses are from Orbital Express documents, internal to Space Systems/LORAL.
23
 All structural mass and cost savings estimates are from a structural engineer from Space
Systems/LORAL, who is familiar with structural cost and mass savings associated with configuration
changes.
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vehicle adapter.  The mass of each adapter is assumed to be 100 kg.  This leads to a
single-spacecraft mass capacity of 1481 kg and 1589 kg for AQR 1a and 1b respectively.
Result
After the components discussed above and the launch vehicle capacity are taken into
account, a final ∆mass is found for both AQR 1a and 1b. The calculations for each case
are shown in Appendix A. 
 The ∆mass for AQR 1a is -157.8 kg.  The negative sign indicates that the final AQR 1a
spacecraft mass, before the addition or subtraction of transponders, is greater than the
launch vehicle capacity.  This occurs because AQR 1a requires two spacecraft on one
launch vehicle.  The ∆mass for AQR 1b is –58.0 kg.  Again, the negative sign indicates
that the redesigned AQR 1b spacecraft is greater than the launch vehicle capacity.  The
effect of having negative ∆masses is discussed in the limiting factor analysis.
4.4.3 Volume
The primary volume issue for the AQR 1 spacecraft is whether or not two redesigned
spacecraft can fit into one Atlas IIAS and/or whether one re-designed spacecraft can fit
into the fairing of a Delta 2/7925.  In order to determine this, it is necessary to calculate
the change in volume over the baseline satellite.  The primary drivers of this change in
volume are the fuel tank and the pressurant tank.  These are discussed below. 
After determining the change in volume from the baseline case, the new total volume is
calculated and compared to the size of the two respective launch vehicle fairings.  It is
then determined if either or both cases are feasible.
Fuel Tanks
As more fuel is needed to perform the OR maneuvers from the staging orbit to GEO than
in the baseline case, the volume of the fuel tanks increases.  This new volume is found by
scaling it with the fuel tank mass found in Section 4.4.2.  The method for this is outlined
in the fuel discussion of Section 4.3.3.  The baseline fuel tank volume is 1.9 m3.  The re-
sized fuel tank volumes are 2.5 and 2.7 m3  for AQR 1a and 1b, respectively.  
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Pressurant Tanks
As the volume of the fuel necessary to maneuver to GEO from the staging orbit is greater
than the volume of fuel needed to maneuver to GEO from the baseline GTO orbit, the
volume of the helium needed to fill the fuel volume is greater than in the baseline case.
The equation for the volume of the pressurant tank is presented in the pressurant tanks
discussion in Section 4.4.2.  The deleted baseline pressurant tank has a volume of 0.065
m3, while the volume of the AQR 1a pressurant tank is 0.094 m3  and 1b pressurant tank is
0.100 m3.
Launch Vehicle Capacity
The launch vehicle volume capacity is a concern for the AQR 1a spacecraft because two
spacecraft are being launched on one launch vehicle.  Twice the AQR 1a spacecraft
volume is compared to the volume capacity of the Atlas IIAS fairing to determine that it
is possible to fit two of the redesigned spacecraft into one fairing.
The AQR 1b volume is also an issue, from the perspective of launch vehicle capacity,
because it must fit into the volume of the Delta 2/7925 fairing.  The AQR 1b volume is
calculated and compared to the volume of the Delta 2/7925 fairing to determine if it is
possible to fit one redesigned spacecraft into the smaller fairing.   
Result
After re-sizing the baseline fuel tanks and helium pressurant tanks, the differences
between the volume of the baseline case and the serviced spacecraft are 0.6 and 0.8 m3
for AQR 1a and 1b, respectively.
After subtracting this volume from the volume of the baseline spacecraft, each case
volume is compared to the volume of its respective launch vehicle fairing.  In AQR 1a
the Atlas IIAS will support two-redesigned spacecraft1b (Mission Planner’s Guide for
the Atlas Launch Vehicle Family, 1992). In AQR, however, the spacecraft volume is
larger than the volume of the Delta 2/7925 fairing by –1.8 m3  (Delta II Payload Planners
Guide, 2000).  Thus, the AQR 1b spacecraft is not a viable option, because reducing its
size by 1.8 m3  completely depletes its revenue generating capabilities.  As the AQR 1b
satellite is not a feasible option, it will not be discussed further in this section.
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4.4.4 Spacecraft Cost
The (spacecraft cost), neglecting the cost of redesign and the cost of a change in the
number of transponders, is the cost of the refueling interface and docking mechanism
minus the value of structural savings.  For AQR 1a, this leads to a (spacecraft cost) of
$4.46 M. 
The cost of redesign for AQR 1a is assumed to be $40 M to account for redesigning the
satellite such that it can take advantage of the upper section of the launch vehicle fairing.
This cost is amortized over 12 spacecraft, thus leading to a per spacecraft redesign cost of
$3.33 M.  Summing this with the other changes in spacecraft cost gives a total
(spacecraft cost) of  $7.8 M.
4.4.5 Launch Vehicle Cost
In AQR 1a, because there are two spacecraft on one launch vehicle, half of the cost of
using an Atlas IIAS to launch to the staging orbit is subtracted from the baseline launch
cost to get a (launch cost) per spacecraft of -$43.9 M.  The negative sign indicates the
spacecraft owner saves $43.9 M on launch costs for each spacecraft. 
4.4.6 Limiting Factor Analysis
The limiting factor analysis is used for each case to determine the number of transponders
that must be subtracted or can be added to the baseline spacecraft, dependent upon the
constraints of the launch vehicle.  The two constraints that are analyzed are mass and
volume.
After calculating the volume of the AQR 1a spacecraft and the useable fairing volume for
the launch vehicle to confirm that two AQR 1a spacecraft can fit onto an Atlas IIAS, it is
found that mass is the limiting factor in determining the number of additional or fewer
transponders.  In order to fit two spacecraft on an Atlas IIAS, it is necessary to reduce
each spacecraft’s mass by 158 kg.  This corresponds to reducing the number of
transponders by 6. 
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4.4.7 Revenue and Cost
Cost
The total cost of the spacecraft and launch vehicle is calculated for each case by adding
the costs associated with the spacecraft, additional transponders, and the launch vehicle.
In AQR 1a, the change in the cost associated with reducing the number of transponders
by six is -$10.1 M.  Adding this change to the other cost changes gives a total cost
decrease of -$46.2 M over the cost of the baseline satellite and launch.  This leads to a
total spacecraft and launch cost of $146.3 M.
Revenue
The total revenue/year is the baseline revenue/year plus the change in revenue/year.  The
change in revenue/year is proportional to the change in the number of transponders.  In
AQR 1a, the decrease in revenue/year is $13.0 M.  This leads to a total revenue per year
of $90.8 M.
4.4.8 Discounted Cash Flow and Options
Using the revenue and cost numbers discussed above, the NPV for AQR 1a is calculated
using a DCF analysis.  An NPV of  $169.4 M is found using revenues of $90.8 M/yr,
total costs of $146.3 M, and a discount rate of 10%.
In addition to the NPV, the value of the option for life extension is calculated using the
method outlined in Section 4.3.11.  The option value is found to be $59.9 M.  The NPV
and life extension option value are summed to get the total present value of $229.3 M.
4.5 AQR 2:  Launch to Staging Orbit and Tug for Orbit
Raising (OR) and North-South Stationkeeping
(NSSK)
4.5.1 Description
This case examines the client’s perspective on the economic viability of launching a
redesigned spacecraft to the staging orbit and then using a tug vehicle to perform its OR
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and NSSK maneuvers.  By using a tug vehicle for OR and NSSK, a large part of the fuel
mass and volume can be removed.  As mentioned previously, there are two means of
increasing profit when there is excess volume and mass available on a spacecraft.  Thus,
this case is broken down into AQR 2a and AQR 2b.  AQR 2a examines the effect of
reducing launch cost by putting two spacecraft on one launch vehicle.  AQR 2b examines
the effect of filling the excess mass and volume capacity with additional transponders.
As the calculations for each case are very similar, they will be presented together
throughout this section.
4.5.2 Mass
As in the other cases, the serviced spacecraft is formed by subtracting the mass of
unnecessary components and adding the mass of required components to the baseline
spacecraft mass.
Fuel Tanks
This case requires substantial changes in the fuel tank mass and volume.  As the satellite
does not have to perform its own OR or NSSK maneuvers, the fuel tanks associated with
these functions are removed.   However, the satellite must maintain its ability to do
EWSK and have a small amount of contingency fuel onboard for NSSK. 
The approach to determining the mass between the baseline and AQR 2 satellites is to
subtract the entire fuel tank, which accounts for OR, NSSK, and EWSK fuel storage,
from the baseline satellite and then to add the fuel tank and fuel associated with EWSK
and NSSK contingency.  The baseline fuel tank is sized using the method outlined in the
fuel tanks discussion in Section 4.3.3.
The reason just the tank volume for OR and NSSK is not simply subtracted, allowing for
just the EWSK storage capacity to be left, is because the final spacecraft masses are
different in AQR 2a and AQR 2b.  This leads to different amounts of necessary EWSK
and NSSK contingency fuel for the life of the spacecraft.   
 In order to determine the mass of the fuel tanks for EWSK and NSSK contingency, the
fuel needed for these maneuvers is calculated.   Although the fuel needed for each case is
different, the same method is used.    First, the EWSK fuel is calculated.  After
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manipulation of the rocket equation, the mass of the EWSK fuel/kg of spacecraft is found
to be
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where ∆V = (2.0 m/s/year)*(Lifetime of Spacecraft in Years) and Isp = 230 sec.  This ratio
is then multiplied by the mass of the spacecraft to find the total mass of EWSK fuel
needed over the lifetime of the satellite.  The NSSK fuel is calculated using the same
method, except that it is calculated for only 1 maneuver.  This allows the number of
NSSK maneuvers that can be supported by the contingency fuel to be varied more easily.
For the purposes of this analysis, the NSSK contingency fuel is assumed to support two
NSSK maneuvers.  This leads to a contingency fuel per kg of spacecraft of
spacecraftkg
fuelkg
M
004.0M
0
fuelyContingencNSSK
=
where a ∆V of 5.6 m/s/NSSK maneuver and an Isp  of 268 sec are used. 
After using these equations to find the mass of the EWSK and NSSK contingency fuel,
the mass of the fuel tanks can be found using the linear relationship found in the fuel
tanks discussion in Section 4.3.3.  The masses of the fuel and fuel tank are then added to
the baseline satellite mass.
Pressurant Tanks
As the spacecraft in AQR 2 only performs EWSK maneuvers on its own, it does not need
a helium pressurant tank.  Thus, the pressurant tank associated with Program A is deleted
from the baseline satellite in the process of forming the AQR 2 spacecraft.  This leads to
a mass savings of 23 kg for both AQR 2a and AQR 2b.
Propulsion System
Since the AQR 2 spacecraft does not perform its own orbit raising maneuvers, it does not
need a main satellite thruster.   It also only needs NSSK capabilities for contingency
operations.  Thus, the main satellite thruster and one level of redundancy for NSSK
thrusters are deleted from the baseline satellite.  It is not necessary to add any additional
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propulsion capabilities to the baseline satellite to form the AQR 2 spacecraft.  This leads
to a mass savings of 20 kg for both AQR 2a and AQR 2b.24 
Docking and Refueling Mechanisms
As the AQR 2 spacecraft utilizes a tug vehicle to perform its OR and NSSK maneuvers, it
is necessary to add docking capabilities to the baseline satellite.  Two sets of identical
docking mechanisms are added to the baseline satellite, to provide for adequate
redundancy.  Each of the tug mechanisms has a mass of 16 kg (Orbital Express
Presentation, 2001).
Structural Savings
As the majority of the fuel and fuel tank volume is deleted from the spacecraft, the
central cylinder, the cylinder that surrounds and supports the fuel tanks, can be removed.
In addition, a small amount of other structural savings can be realized because the fuel
tanks do not need to be supported through the harsh launch environment.  This leads to a
structural savings estimate of 17 kg for both cases.
Launch Vehicle Capacity
As the AQR 2 spacecraft are launched directly to the staging orbit, there is a mass penalty
associated with this case.  The launch vehicle mass capacity to staging is 85% of the
capability to the baseline GTO.  The total mass capacity for Atlas IIAS to GTO is 3719
kg and the mass capacity for Delta 2/7295 to GTO is 1869 kg. In addition, using one
launch vehicle for two spacecraft requires an additional launch vehicle adapter.  The mass
of each adapter is assumed to be 100 kg.  This leads to a single spacecraft mass capacity
of 1480.6 kg and 1589 kg for AQR 2a and 2b, respectively.
Results
After the components listed above and the launch vehicle capacity are taken into account,
a final ∆mass is found for both AQR 2a and AQR 2b. The calculations for each case are
shown in Appendix A. 
                                               
24
 This mass savings estimate is from a Space Systems/LORAL employee with access to propulsion system
component masses.
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 The ∆mass for AQR 2a is –5.1 kg.  The negative sign indicates that the final AQR 2a
spacecraft mass, before the addition or subtraction of transponders, is greater than the
launch vehicle capacity.  This occurs because AQR 2a requires two spacecraft on one
launch vehicle.  The effect of this is discussed further in the limiting factor analysis
section.  The ∆mass AQR 2b is 1546.4 kg.
4.5.3 Volume
The primary volume issue for the AQR 2a spacecraft is whether or not two redesigned
spacecraft can fit into one Atlas IIAS.  The primary issue for the AQR 2b satellite is how
much additional volume will be available for the addition of transponders.  To solve these
issues, it is necessary to calculate the changes in volume over the baseline satellite.  The
primary drivers of this change in volume are the fuel and pressurant tanks.  These are
discussed below. 
Fuel Tanks
The approach used to account for the removal of part of the fuel tank is to delete the
standard baseline tank and add in a tank with the capacity to hold the EWSK and NSSK
contingency fuel.  The volume of the standard fuel tank is found to be 1.9 m3  by
multiplying its mass by volume per mass percentage.  Using the same method, the
volume of the EWSK and NSSK contingency tank is found to be 0.02 and 0.05 m3, for
AQR 2a and 2b, respectively.
Pressurant Tanks
As mentioned previously, the AQR 2a and b spacecraft do not need helium pressurant
tanks.  Thus, the pressurant tank associated with Program A is deleted from the baseline
satellite in the process of forming the AQR 2 spacecraft.  This leads to a volume savings
of 0.065 m3  for both AQR 2a and 2b.
Launch Vehicle Capacity
The launch vehicle volume capacity is a concern for the AQR 2a spacecraft because two
spacecraft are being added to one launch vehicle.  Twice the AQR 2a spacecraft volume
is compared to the volume capacity of the Atlas IIAS fairing to determine that it is
possible to fit two of the redesigned spacecraft into one fairing.
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The AQR 2b volume is not an issue, from the perspective of launch vehicle capacity,
because it is sized to have the same volume as the baseline satellite, which is known to fit
into the Atlas IIAS fairing.   
Result
After deleting the baseline fuel tanks and helium pressurant tanks and adding the fuel
tank for EWSK and contingency NSSK fuel, the additional volume available for
transponders is 1.88 m3  for AQR 2b.  It is assumed that no additional volume is available
for the AQR 2a spacecraft because the total volume of two AQR 2a satellites is greater
than one baseline satellite. 
4.5.4 Spacecraft Cost
The (spacecraft cost), neglecting the cost of redesign and the cost of additional
transponders, is the cost of the EWSK and contingency fuel tank plus the cost of the tug
mechanism, minus the cost of the baseline fuel tank, the NSSK redundant thruster
system, the main satellite thruster and the savings associated with the reduced structural
needs.  For both AQR 2a and 2b, this leads to a (spacecraft cost) of -$0.89 M.  The
negative sign indicates a decrease in cost as compared to the baseline case.
In addition, the cost of redesign is assumed to be $40 M and $60 M, amortized over 12
spacecraft, for AQR 2a and b, respectively.  This leads to a per spacecraft redesign cost
of $3.33 M and $5 M for 2a and b and total (spacecraft costs) of $2.44 and $4.11 M,
respectively.
4.5.5 Launch Vehicle Cost
Unlike the (spacecraft cost), the cost of the launch vehicle per spacecraft differs
dramatically for AQR 2a and 2b.  In AQR 2a, because there are two spacecraft on one
launch vehicle, half of the cost of using an Atlas IIAS to launch to the staging orbit is
subtracted from the baseline launch cost to get a (launch cost) per spacecraft of -$43.9
M.  The negative sign indicates the spacecraft owner saves $43.9 M for each spacecraft. 
In AQR 2b the change in launch vehicle cost is calculated by subtracting the baseline
launch cost from the cost of using an Atlas IIAS to launch to staging orbit.  For both
 92
AQR 2a and 2b a 10% increase in launch vehicle cost is assumed to account for launch
vehicle modifications, primarily to the vehicle software, necessary to change the final
orbit from GTO to the staging orbit. This is a $9.8 M increase in launch cost.
4.5.6 Limiting Factor Analysis
The limiting factor analysis is used for each case to determine the number of transponders
that must be subtracted or can be added to the baseline spacecraft, dependent upon the
constraints of the launch vehicle.  The two constraints analyzed are mass and volume.
After calculating the volume of the AQR 2a spacecraft and the useable fairing volume for
the launch vehicle to confirm that two AQR 2a spacecraft can fit onto an Atlas IIAS, it is
found that mass is the limiting factor in determining the number of transponders.  In order
to fit two spacecraft on an Atlas IIAS, it is necessary to reduce each spacecraft’s mass by
5.1 kg.  Although this can probably be accomplished without having to remove
transponders, for the sake of consistency across the other cases one transponder is
removed from the AQR 2a spacecraft. 
The AQR 2b spacecraft also has mass as its limiting factor.  However, unlike AQR 2a,
the AQR 2b spacecraft has an additional available mass of 1546 kg, which corresponds to
an additional 56 transponders.
4.5.7 Revenue and Cost
The final revenue and cost are found by taking into account the previously mentioned
changes as well as those associated with the change in the number of transponders from
the baseline case.
Cost
The total cost of the spacecraft and launch vehicle is calculated by adding the costs
associated with the spacecraft, additional transponders, and the launch vehicle.  In AQR
2a the change in the cost associated with reducing the number of transponders by one is 
-$1.7 M.  Adding this change to the other cost changes gives a cost decrease of $43.1 M
over the cost of the baseline satellite and launch.  This leads to a total spacecraft and
launch cost of $149.4 M.
 93
In AQR 2b the cost associated with increasing the number of transponders on the
spacecraft by 56 is $94.2 M.  Adding this change to the other cost changes gives a total
cost increase of $108.1 M.  This leads to a total spacecraft and launch cost of $300.6 M.
Revenue
The total revenue/year is the baseline revenue/year plus the change in revenue/year.  In
AQR 2a the decrease in revenue/year is $2.2 M.  This leads to a total revenue per year of
$101.6 M.  In AQR 2b the increase in revenue/year is $121.0 M, leading to a total
revenue per year of $224.8 M.
4.5.8 Discounted Cash Flow and Options
Using the revenue and cost numbers discussed above, NPVs for AQR 2a and b are
calculated using a DCF analysis.  NPVs of  $198.3 M and $459.6 M are found for AQR
2a and b, respectively, using revenues of $101.6 and $224.8 M/yr, total costs of $149.4
and $300.6 M, and a discount rate of 10%. 
In addition to the NPV, the value of the option for life extension is calculated using the
method outlined in Section 4.3.11.  The option values are found to have present values of
$67.0 and $148.7 M, for AQR 2a and b, respectively.  The NPV and life extension option
value are summed for total present values of $265.3 and $608.3 M for AQR 2a and b.
4.6 AQR 3:  Direct GEO Insertion (DGI) with Tug for
North-South Stationkeeping (NSSK)
4.6.1 Description
This case examines the client’s perspective of the economic viability of using DGI to
launch a redesigned spacecraft directly to GEO and using a tug vehicle to perform its
North-South Stationkeeping maneuvers.  By using DGI and a tug vehicle for NSSK, a
large part of the fuel mass and volume can be reduced.   Although fuel mass is reduced,
there is a significant mass penalty associated with launching directly to GEO and this
volume and mass translate to additional transponders.
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4.6.2 Mass
As in the other cases, the serviced spacecraft is formed by subtracting the mass of
unnecessary components and adding the mass of required components to the baseline
spacecraft mass.
Fuel Tanks
This case requires substantial changes in the fuel tank mass and volume.  As the satellite
does not have to perform its own OR or NSSK maneuvers, the fuel tanks associated with
these functions are removed.   However, the satellite must maintain its ability to do
EWSK and have a small amount of contingency fuel onboard for NSSK. 
The approach to determining the mass between the baseline and AQR 3 satellite is to
subtract the entire fuel tank, which accounts for OR, NSSK, and EWSK fuel storage,
from the baseline satellite and add the fuel tank and fuel associated with EWSK and
NSSK contingency.  The baseline fuel tank is sized using the method outlined in the fuel
tanks discussion of Section 4.3.3.
The reason just the tank volume for OR and NSSK is not simply subtracted, allowing for
just the EWSK storage capacity to be left, is because the final AQR 3 spacecraft dry mass
is different than the baseline spacecraft.  This leads to a different amount of EWSK and
NSSK contingency fuel necessary for the life of the spacecraft.   
 In order to determine the mass of the fuel tanks for EWSK and NSSK contingency, the
fuel needed for these maneuvers is calculated.  First, the EWSK fuel is calculated.  After
slight manipulation of the rocket equation, the mass of the EWSK fuel/kg of spacecraft is
found to be
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where ∆V = (2.0 m/s/year)*(Lifetime of Spacecraft in Years) and Isp = 230 sec.  This ratio
is then multiplied by the mass of the spacecraft to find the total mass of EWSK fuel
needed over the lifetime of the satellite.  The NSSK fuel is calculated using the same
method, except that it is calculated for a single maneuver.  This allows the number of
NSSK maneuvers supported by the contingency fuel to be varied more easily.  For the
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purposes of this analysis, the NSSK contingency fuel is assumed to support  two NSSK
maneuvers.  This leads to a contingency fuel per kg of spacecraft of
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where a ∆V of 5.6 m/s/NSSK maneuver and an Isp  of 268 sec are used. 
After using these equations to find the mass of the EWSK and NSSK contingency fuel,
the mass of the fuel tanks can be found using the linear relationship found in the fuel
tanks discussion in Section 4.3.3.  This leads to a mass of 45.1 kg of fuel and 5.0 kg for
the fuel tank itself.  The masses of the fuel and fuel tank are then added to the baseline
satellite mass.
Pressurant Tanks
As the spacecraft in AQR 3 only performs EWSK maneuvers on its own, it does not need
a helium pressurant tank.  Thus, the pressurant tank associated with Program A is deleted
from the baseline satellite in the process of forming the AQR 3 spacecraft.  This leads to
a mass savings of 23 kg.
Propulsion System
As the AQR 3 spacecraft does not perform its own orbit raising maneuvers, it does not
need a main satellite thruster.   Furthermore, it only needs NSSK capabilities for
contingency operations.  Thus, the main satellite thruster and one level of redundancy for
NSSK thrusters are deleted from the baseline satellite.  It is not necessary to add any
additional propulsion capabilities to the baseline satellite to form the AQR 3 spacecraft.
This leads to a mass savings of 20 kg. 
Docking and Refueling Mechanisms
The AQR 3 spacecraft utilizes a tug vehicle to perform its NSSK maneuvers.  Thus, it is
necessary to add docking capabilities to the baseline satellite.  Two sets of identical
docking mechanisms are added to the baseline satellite, in order to provide for adequate
redundancy.  Each of the tug mechanisms has a mass of 16 kg, which leads to a total
mass addition of 32 kg.
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Structural Savings
The majority of the fuel and fuel tank volume is deleted from the spacecraft.  Therefore,
the central cylinder is removed.  In addition, a small amount of other structural savings
can be realized because the fuel tanks do not need to be supported through the harsh
launch environment.  This leads to a structural savings estimate of 17 kg.
Launch Vehicle Capacity
As the AQR 3 spacecraft is launched directly to GEO, there is a mass penalty associated
with this case.  The launch vehicle mass capacity to GEO is 76% of the capability to the
baseline GTO.  The total mass capacity for Atlas IIAS to GTO is 3719 kg.  After
accounting for the decreased mass capabilities and the 100 kg adapter, this leads to a total
launch vehicle mass capacity of 2726 kg.
Result
After the components listed above and the launch vehicle capacity are taken into account,
a final ∆mass is found for AQR 3. The calculations for this case are shown in Appendix
A.  The ∆mass for AQR 3 is 1217.9 kg.  The positive sign indicates that the AQR 3
spacecraft mass, before the addition or subtraction of transponders, is less than the launch
vehicle capacity. 
4.6.3 Volume
The primary volume issue for the AQR 3 spacecraft is the additional volume available for
transponders.  To determine this, it is necessary to calculate the change in volume over
the baseline satellite.  The primary drivers of this change in volume are the fuel tank and
the pressurant tank.  These are discussed below. 
Fuel Tanks
The approach used to account for the removal of part of the fuel tank is to delete the
standard baseline tank and add a tank with the capacity to hold the EWSK and NSSK
contingency fuel.  The volume of the standard fuel tank is found to be 1.9 m3  by
multiplying its mass by the volume per mass percentage.  Using the same method, the
volume of the EWSK and NSSK contingency tank is found to be 0.01 m3.
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Pressurant Tanks
As mentioned previously, the AQR 3 spacecraft does not need a helium pressurant tank.
Thus, the pressurant tank associated with Program A is deleted from the baseline satellite
in the process of forming the AQR 3 spacecraft.  This leads to a volume savings of 0.065
m3.
Launch Vehicle Capacity
The AQR 3 volume is not an issue, from the perspective of launch vehicle capacity,
because it is sized to have the same volume as the baseline satellite, which is known to fit
into the Atlas IIAS fairing.   
Result
After deleting the baseline fuel tanks and helium pressurant tanks and adding the fuel
tank for EWSK and contingency NSSK fuel, the additional volume available for
transponders is 1.92 m3  for AQR 3.
4.6.4 Spacecraft Cost
The (spacecraft cost), neglecting the cost of redesign and the cost of additional
transponders, is the cost of the EWSK and contingency fuel tank plus the cost of the tug
mechanism, minus the cost of the baseline fuel tank, the NSSK redundant thruster
system, the main satellite thruster, and the savings associated with the reduced structural
needs.  This leads to a (spacecraft cost) of -$0.89 M.  The negative sign indicates a
decrease in cost from the baseline case.
In addition, the cost of redesign for AQR 3 is assumed to be $60 M, amortized over 12
spacecraft.  This leads to a per spacecraft redesign cost of $5 M and a total (spacecraft
cost) of $4.11 M. 
4.6.5 Launch Vehicle Cost
The change in launch vehicle cost is calculated by subtracting the baseline launch cost
from the cost of using an Atlas IIAS to launch directly to GEO.  This is a $14.6 M
increase in launch cost.
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4.6.6 Limiting Factor Analysis
The limiting factor analysis is used for each case to determine the number of transponders
that must be subtracted or can be added to the baseline spacecraft, dependent upon the
constraints of the launch vehicle.  The two constraints analyzed are mass and volume.
The AQR 3 spacecraft has mass as its limiting factor.  The AQR 3 spacecraft has an
additional available mass of 1218 kg, which corresponds to an additional 44
transponders.
4.6.7 Revenue and Cost
The final revenue and cost are found by taking into account the previously mentioned
changes as well as those associated with the change in the number of transponders from
the baseline case.
Cost
The change in the cost associated with increasing the number of transponders on the
spacecraft by 44 is $74.0 M.  Adding this change to the other cost changes gives a total
cost increase of $92.8 M.  This leads to a total spacecraft and launch cost of $285.3 M.
Revenue
The total revenue/year is the baseline revenue/year plus the change in revenue/year.  The
change in revenue/year is proportional to the change in the number of transponders.  The
increase in revenue/year for AQR 3 is $95.1 M, leading to a total revenue per year of
$198.9 M.
4.6.8 Discounted Cash Flow and Options
Using the revenue and cost numbers discussed above, the NPV for AQR 3 is calculated
using a DCF analysis.  An NPV of  $395.1 M is found with a revenue of $198.9 M/yr, a
total cost of $285.3 M, and a discount rate of 10%.
In addition to the NPV, the value of the option for life extension is calculated using the
method outlined in Section 4.3.11.  The option value is found to be $131.5 M.  The NPV
and life extension option value are summed for the total present value of $526.6 M.
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4.7 AQR 4:  Direct GEO Insertion with Just in Time
Refueling
4.7.1 Description
This case examines the client’s perspective of the economic viability of launching a
redesigned spacecraft directly to GEO and using a servicing vehicle to refuel the satellite
between each North-South Stationkeeping maneuver.  By using DGI and refueling, a
large part of the fuel mass and volume can be reduced.   Although fuel and tank mass can
be reduced, there is a significant mass penalty associated with launching directly to GEO
and this volume and mass translates to additional transponders.
4.7.2 Mass
As in the other cases, the serviced spacecraft is formed by subtracting the mass of
unnecessary components and adding the mass of required components to the baseline
spacecraft mass.
Fuel Tanks
This case requires substantial changes in the fuel tank mass and volume.  As the satellite
does not have to perform its own OR maneuver, the fuel tanks associated with this
function are removed.   The satellite must maintain its ability to do EWSK and NSSK
maneuvers.   The fuel tanks needed to store the fuel for these maneuvers are refueled
between each NSSK maneuver (approximately every 41 days), which makes them much
smaller than the standard tanks.
The approach to determining the mass between the baseline and AQR 4 satellite is to
subtract the entire fuel tank, which accounts for OR, NSSK, and EWSK fuel storage,
from the baseline satellite and add the fuel tank and fuel associated with one 41-day
supply of EWSK and NSSK fuel and contingency fuel.  The baseline fuel tank is sized
using the method outlined in the fuel tanks discussion of Section 4.3.3.
To determine the mass of the fuel tanks for EWSK and NSSK, the fuel needed for these
maneuvers is calculated.  First, the EWSK fuel is calculated.  After slight manipulation of
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the rocket equation, the mass of the EWSK fuel/kg of spacecraft needed between
refuelings is found to be
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where ∆V = (2.0 m/s/year)*(41 days of maneuvers/365 days/year) and Isp = 230 sec.  This
ratio is then multiplied by the mass of the spacecraft to find the total mass of EWSK fuel
needed between refuelings.
The NSSK fuel is calculated using the same method, except that it is calculated for only
one maneuver.  This allows the number of NSSK maneuvers that can be supported
between refuelings and by the contingency fuel to be varied more easily.  For the
purposes of this study, the NSSK contingency fuel is assumed to support two NSSK
maneuvers.  This leads to a contingency fuel per kg of spacecraft of
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and the NSSK fuel between refuelings to be
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where a ∆V of 5.6 m/s/NSSK maneuver and an Isp  of 268 sec are used. 
After using these equations to find the mass of the EWSK and NSSK fuel, the mass of the
fuel tanks can be found using the linear relationship found in the fuel tanks discussion in
Section 4.3.3.  This leads to a mass of 16.8 kg of fuel and 1.8 kg for the fuel tank itself.
The masses of the fuel and fuel tank are then added to the baseline satellite mass.
Pressurant Tanks
As with the fuel tanks, it is necessary to re-size the helium pressurant tanks for the AQR
4 spacecraft to account for the helium needed to fill the fuel tanks between each
refueling.  The approach here is to subtract the baseline satellite pressurant tank, which
has a mass of 23 kg, and add the newly sized pressurant tanks.
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The mass of a pressurant tank is proportional to its volume.  Thus, the volume of the
pressurant tank is calculated and the mass found by linearly scaling it with the mass of
the baseline pressurant tank.  As helium is used only to pressurize the volume of the fuel
tank left empty after each NSSK maneuver, the volume of the helium tank can be found
by using the ideal gas law.  Therefore, the volume of the helium tank is
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This leads to a pressurant tank mass of 10.7 kg.
Propulsion System
As the AQR 4 spacecraft does not perform its own orbit raising maneuvers, it does not
need a main satellite thruster.  Thus, the main satellite thruster is deleted from the
baseline satellite, resulting in a mass savings of 5.0 kg. 
Docking and Refueling Mechanisms
The AQR 4 satellite requires capabilities to dock with and be refueled by a servicing
satellite. Therefore, it needs both docking and refueling mechanisms.  The redundant
docking mechanism has a mass of 32 kg and the refueling mechanism has a mass of 50
kg.  This leads to a mass addition of 82 kg to the baseline satellite.25 
Structural Savings
The majority of the fuel and fuel tank volume is deleted from the spacecraft.  Therefore,
the central cylinder is removed.  In addition, a small amount of other structural savings
can be realized because the fuel tanks do not need to be supported through the harsh
launch environment.  This leads to a structural savings estimate of 17 kg.
                                               
25
 These numbers are from an employee at Space Systems/LORAL, who has experience with satellite
servicing studies.
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Launch Vehicle Capacity
As the AQR 4 spacecraft is launched directly to GEO, there is a mass penalty associated
with this case.  The launch vehicle mass capacity to GEO is 76% of the capability to the
baseline GTO.  The total mass capacity for Atlas IIAS to GTO is 3719 kg.  After
accounting for the reduced launch capability and the mass of a 100-kg launch vehicle
adapter, this leads to a total launch vehicle mass capacity of 2726 kg.
Result
After the components listed above and the launch vehicle capacity are taken into account,
a final ∆mass is found for the AQR 4 spacecraft. The calculations for this case are shown
in Appendix A.  The ∆mass for AQR 4 is 1173.6 kg.  The positive sign indicates that the
final AQR 4 spacecraft mass, before the addition or subtraction of transponders, is less
than the launch vehicle capacity. 
4.7.3 Volume
The primary volume issue for the AQR 4 spacecraft is the volume available for additional
transponders.  In order to determine this, it is necessary to calculate the change in volume
over the baseline satellite.  The primary drivers of this change in volume are the fuel tank
and the pressurant tank.  These are discussed below. 
Fuel Tanks
The approach used to account for the removal of part of the fuel tank is to delete the
standard baseline tank and add in a tank with the capacity to hold the a 41 day supply of
EWSK and NSSK fuel and NSSK contingency fuel for maneuvers.  The volume of the
standard fuel tank is found to be 1.9 m3  by multiplying its mass by the volume per mass
percentage.  Using the same method, the volume of the AQR 4 EWSK and NSSK tank is
0.016 m3.
Pressurant Tanks
The AQR 4 helium in the pressurant tank is used only to pressurize the volume of the fuel
tank left empty after each NSSK maneuver. The equation for the volume of the
pressurant tank is presented in the pressurant tanks discussion in Section 4.7.2.  The
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deleted baseline pressurant tank has a volume of 0.065 m3, while the volume of the AQR
4 pressurant tank is 0.033 m3.
Launch Vehicle Capacity
The AQR 4 volume is not an issue, from the perspective of launch vehicle capacity,
because it is sized to have the same volume as the baseline satellite, which is known to fit
into the Atlas IIAS fairing.   
Result
After deleting the baseline fuel tanks and helium pressurant tanks and adding the resized
fuel and pressurant tanks, the additional volume available for transponders is 1.88 m3  for
AQR 4.
4.7.4 Spacecraft Cost
The (spacecraft cost), neglecting the cost of redesign and the cost of additional
transponders, is the cost of the resized fuel tank plus the cost of the docking and refueling
mechanisms, minus the cost of the baseline fuel tank, the NSSK redundant thruster
system, the main satellite thruster, and the savings associated with reduced structural
needs.  This leads to a (spacecraft cost) of $5.91 M.  The positive sign indicates an
increase in cost from the baseline case.
The cost of redesign for AQR 4 is assumed to be $60 M, amortized over 12 spacecraft.
This leads to a per spacecraft redesign cost of $5 M for AQR 4 and a total (spacecraft
cost) of $10.91 M.
4.7.5 Launch Vehicle Cost
The change in launch vehicle cost is calculated by subtracting the baseline launch cost
from the cost of using an Atlas IIAS to launch directly to GEO.  This is a $14.6 M
increase in launch cost.
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4.7.6 Limiting Factor Analysis
The limiting factor analysis is used for each case to determine the number of transponders
that must be subtracted or can be added to the baseline spacecraft, dependent upon the
constraints of the launch vehicle.  The two constraints analyzed are mass and volume.
The AQR 4 spacecraft has mass as its limiting factor.  The AQR 4 spacecraft has an
additional available mass of 1174 kg, which corresponds to an additional 42
transponders.
4.7.7 Revenue and Cost
The final revenue and cost are found by taking into account the previously mentioned
changes as well as those associated with the change in the number of transponders from
the baseline case.
Cost
The change in the cost associated with increasing the number of transponders on the
spacecraft by 42 is $70.7 M.  Adding this change to the other cost changes gives a total
cost increase of $96.2 M.  This leads to a total spacecraft and launch cost of $288.7 M.
Revenue
The total revenue/year is the baseline revenue/year plus the change in revenue/year.  The
change in revenue/year is proportional to the change in the number of transponders.  The
increase in revenue/year for AQR 4 is $90.8 M, leading to a total revenue per year of
$194.5 M.
4.7.8 Discounted Cash Flow and Options
Using the revenue and cost numbers discussed above, the NPV for AQR 4 is calculated
using a DCF analysis.  An NPV of  $380.6 M is found with a revenue of $194.5 M/yr, a
total cost of $288.7 M, and a discount rate of 10%.
In addition to the NPV, the value of the option for life extension is calculated using the
method outlined in Section 4.3.11.  The option is found to have a present value of $128.7
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M.  The NPV and life extension option value are summed for a total present value of
$509.3 M.
4.8 AQR 5:  Direct GEO Insertion with Lower
Frequency Refueling
4.8.1 Description
This case examines the client’s perspective of the economic viability of using (DGI) to
launch a redesigned spacecraft directly to GEO and using a servicing vehicle to refuel the
satellite for its North-South stationkeeping maneuvers.  The difference between this case
and AQR 4 is that the AQR 5 spacecraft is refueled less often.  The AQR 5 spacecraft is
refueled approximately once a year.  It is refueled 12 times over the course of its 15-year
lifetime. 
This frequency of refueling was chosen because the number of additional transponders
that can be added to the spacecraft is a step function of the frequency of refueling.  This
is because mass is the limiting factor. The slight increases in mass associated with
reducing the frequency of refueling by one to two NSSK maneuvers does not necessarily
reduce the number of additional transponders that can be added to the spacecraft.  Since
the number of transponders aboard the spacecraft is a primary driver of cost and revenue,
it is optimal to maximize it for a given range of refueling frequency.  A serviced
spacecraft can support an additional 40 transponders if it is serviced with either 8, 9, 10,
or 11 NSSK maneuvers between servicings or 39 transponders if it is serviced with either
12, 13, or 14 NSSK maneuvers between servicings. The optimal solution in this range is
to have it serviced the least frequently  (i.e. 11 NSSK maneuvers between refuelings)
with the greatest amount of revenue generation capabilities (i.e. 40 transponders).
Having eleven maneuvers between refuelings requires refueling every 451 days, or 12
refuelings over the course of the satellite’s 15-year lifetime.  The range of 8-14
maneuvers per refueling examined here is approximately one refueling every 1 to 1.5
years. 
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This case is important for two reasons.  First, the less frequently a servicing vehicle has to
visit each of its client spacecraft, the more clients it can have.  This reduces the cost of
servicing because the on-orbit infrastructure is reduced.  Second, the risk associated with
servicing can be reduced if the docking and refueling is performed less frequently.
4.8.2 Mass
As in the other cases, the serviced spacecraft is formed by subtracting the mass of
unnecessary components and adding the mass of required components to the baseline
spacecraft mass.
Fuel Tanks
This case requires substantial changes to the fuel tank mass and volume.  As the satellite
does not have to perform its own OR maneuvers, the fuel tanks associated with this
function are removed.   However, the satellite must maintain its ability to do EWSK and
NSSK maneuvers.   The fuel tanks needed to store the fuel for these maneuvers are
replenished after 11 NSSK maneuvers (approximately once every 1.2 years), which
makes them much smaller than the standard tanks.
The approach to determining the mass between the baseline and AQR 5 satellite is to
subtract the entire fuel tank, which accounts for OR, NSSK, and EWSK fuel storage,
from the baseline satellite and add the fuel tank and fuel associated with a 1.2-year supply
of EWSK and NSSK fuel and contingency fuel.  The baseline fuel tank is sized using the
method outlined in the fuel tanks discussion of Section 4.3.3.
In order to determine the mass of the fuel tanks for EWSK and NSSK, the fuel needed for
these maneuvers is calculated.  First, the EWSK fuel is calculated.  The mass of the
EWSK fuel/kg of spacecraft needed between refuelings is found to be
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where ∆V = (2.0 m/s/year)*(451 days between refuelings/365 days/year) and Isp = 230
sec.  This ratio is multiplied by the mass of the spacecraft to find the total mass of EWSK
fuel needed between refuelings.
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The NSSK fuel is calculated using the same method, but for only one maneuver.  This
allows the number of NSSK maneuvers that can be supported between refuelings and by
the contingency fuel to be varied more easily.  For the purposes of this study, the NSSK
contingency fuel is assumed to support 2 NSSK maneuvers.  This leads to a contingency
fuel per kg of spacecraft of
spacecraftkg
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and NSSK fuel between refuelings of
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using a ∆V of 5.6 m/s/NSSK maneuver and an Isp  of 268 sec. 
After using these equations to find the mass of the EWSK and NSSK fuel, the mass of the
fuel tanks is found using the linear relationship found in the fuel tanks discussion in
Section 4.3.3.  This leads to a mass of 72.8 kg of fuel and 8.0 kg for the fuel tank itself.
The masses of the fuel and fuel tank are then added to the baseline satellite mass.
Pressurant Tanks
It is also necessary to re-size the helium pressurant tanks for the AQR 5 spacecraft to
account for the helium needed to fill the fuel tanks between each refueling.  The approach
here is to subtract the baseline satellite pressurant tank, which has a mass of 23 kg, and
add the newly sized pressurant tanks.
The mass of a pressurant tank is proportional to its volume.  This allows the volume of
the pressurant tank to be calculated and the mass found by linearly scaling it with the
mass of the baseline pressurant tank.  As the helium is used only to pressurize the volume
of the fuel tank left empty after each NSSK maneuver, the volume of the helium tank can
be found by using the Ideal Gas Law.  Therefore, the volume of the helium tank is
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The mass of the tank is found using
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This leads to a pressurant tank mass of 10.7 kg.
Propulsion System
As the AQR 5 spacecraft does not perform its own orbit raising maneuvers, it does not
need a main satellite thruster.  Thus, the main satellite thruster is deleted from the
baseline satellite, resulting in a mass savings of 5 kg. 
Docking and Refueling Mechanisms
The AQR 5 satellite requires capabilities to dock with and be refueled by a servicing
satellite. Therefore, it needs both docking and refueling mechanisms.  The redundant
docking mechanism has a mass of 32 kg and the refueling mechanism has a mass of 50
kg.  This leads to a mass addition of 82 kg to the baseline satellite.
Structural Savings
The majority of the fuel and fuel tank volume is deleted from the spacecraft.  Therefore,
the central cylinder can be removed.  In addition, a small amount of other structural
savings can be realized because the fuel tanks do not need to be supported through the
harsh launch environment.  This leads to a structural savings estimate of 17 kg.
Launch Vehicle Capacity
As the AQR 5 spacecraft is launched directly to GEO, there is a mass penalty associated
with this case.  The launch vehicle mass capacity to GEO is 76% of the capability to the
baseline GTO.  The total mass capacity for Atlas IIAS to GTO is 3719 kg.  After
accounting for the decreased launch capability and the mass of a 100 kg launch vehicle
adapter, this leads to a total launch vehicle mass capacity of 2726 kg.
Result
After the components listed above and the launch vehicle capacity are taken into account,
a final ∆mass is found for the AQR 5 spacecraft. The calculations for this case are shown
in Appendix A.  The ∆mass for AQR 4 is 1111.4 kg.  The positive sign indicates that the
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final AQR 5 spacecraft mass, before the addition or subtraction of transponders, is less
than the launch vehicle capacity. 
4.8.3 Volume
The primary volume issue for the AQR 5 spacecraft is the additional volume available for
transponders.  In order to determine this, it is necessary to calculate the change in volume
over the baseline satellite.  The primary drivers of this change in volume are the fuel tank
and the pressurant tank.  These are discussed below. 
Fuel Tanks
The approach used to account for the removal of part of the fuel tank is to delete the
standard baseline tank and add in a tank with the capacity to hold the a 451-day supply of
EWSK and NSSK fuel and NSSK contingency fuel for 2 maneuvers.  The volume of the
standard fuel tank is found to be 1.9 m3  by multiplying its mass by the volume per mass
percentage.  Using the same method, the volume of the AQR 5 EWSK and NSSK tank is
found to be 0.071 m3.
Pressurant Tanks
In AQR 5 the helium in the pressurant tank is used only to pressurize the volume of the
fuel tank left empty after each NSSK maneuver. The equation for the volume of the
pressurant tank is presented in the pressurant tanks discussion in Section 4.8.2.  The
deleted baseline pressurant tank has a volume of 0.065 m3, while the volume of the AQR
5 pressurant tank is 0.033 m3.
Launch Vehicle Capacity
The AQR 5 volume is not an issue, from the perspective of launch vehicle capacity,
because it is sized to have the same volume as the baseline satellite, which is known to fit
into the Atlas IIAS fairing.   
Result
After deleting the baseline fuel tanks and helium pressurant tanks and adding the resized
fuel and pressurant tanks, the additional volume available for transponders is 1.83 m3  for
AQR 5.
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4.8.4 Spacecraft Cost
The ∆spacecraft cost, neglecting the cost of redesign and the cost of additional
transponders, is the cost of the resized fuel tank plus the cost of the docking and refueling
mechanisms, minus the cost of the baseline fuel tank, the NSSK redundant thruster
system, the main satellite thruster, and the savings associated with the reduced structural
needs.  This leads to a ∆spacecraft cost of $5.91 M.  The positive sign indicates an
increase in cost from the baseline case.
The cost of redesign for AQR 5 is assumed to be $60 M, amortized over 12 spacecraft.
This leads to a per spacecraft redesign cost of $5 M and a total (spacecraft cost) of
$10.91 M.
4.8.5 Launch Vehicle Cost
The change in launch vehicle cost is calculated by subtracting the baseline launch cost
from the cost of using an Atlas IIAS to launch directly to GEO.  It is assumed that 15%
increase in launch vehicle cost is incurred to account for launch vehicle modifications,
primarily to the vehicle software, necessary to change the final orbit from GTO to GEO.
This is a $14.6 M increase in launch cost.
4.8.6 Limiting Factor Analysis
The limiting factor analysis is used for each case to determine the number of transponders
that must be subtracted or can be added to the baseline spacecraft, dependent upon the
constraints of the launch vehicle.  The two constraints analyzed are mass and volume.
The AQR 5 spacecraft has mass as its limiting factor.  The AQR 5 spacecraft has an
additional available mass of 1111 kg, which corresponds to an additional 40
transponders.
4.8.7 Revenue and Cost
The final revenue and cost are found by taking into account the previously mentioned
changes as well as those associated with the change in the number of transponders from
the baseline case.
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Cost
The change in the cost associated with increasing the number of transponders on the
spacecraft by 40 is $67.3 M.  Adding this change to the other cost changes gives a total
cost increase of $102.8 M.  This leads to a total spacecraft and launch cost of $285.3 M.
Revenue
The total revenue/year is the baseline revenue/year plus the change in revenue/year.  The
change in revenue/year is proportional to the change in the number of transponders.  The
increase in revenue/year for AQR 5 is $86.5 M, leading to a total revenue per year of
$190.2 M.
4.8.8 Discounted Cash Flow and Options
Using the revenue and cost numbers discussed above, the NPV for AQR 5 is calculated
using a DCF analysis.  An NPV of  $370.3 M is found with a revenue of $190.2 M/yr, a
total cost of $285.3 M, and a discount rate of 10%.
In addition to the NPV, the value of the option for life extension is calculated using the
method outlined in Section 4.3.11.  The option value is found to be $125.9 M.  The NPV
and life extension option value are summed for a total present value of $496.2 M.
4.9 AQR 6:  Launch to Staging, Use Tug for Orbit
Raising, and Electric Propulsion (EP) for
Stationkeeping
4.9.1 Description
This case examines the client’s perspective of the economic viability of using servicing
and EP on the same spacecraft.  The satellite is launched to the staging orbit, where it
docks with a tug vehicle that performs its orbit raising maneuvers.  The satellite then uses
Xenon plasma thrusters to perform all of its own stationkeeping maneuvers.  This case is
interesting because it takes advantage of the benefits of both servicing and EP.  By using
a biprop tug vehicle for OR, the spacecraft saves fuel and tank mass and volume.  In
addition, it is able to get to GEO faster than it would if it were to rely on EP for OR.  By
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using EP for stationkeeping, the spacecraft also frees up volume and mass for additional
transponders without having to rely on another satellite.
As mentioned previously, there are two means of increasing profit when there is excess
volume and mass on a spacecraft.  Therefore, the case is broken down into AQR 6a and
AQR 6b.  AQR 6a examines the effect of reducing launch cost by putting two spacecraft
on one launch vehicle.  AQR 6b examines the effect of filling the excess mass and
volume capacity with additional transponders.  As the calculations for each case are very
similar, they will be presented together throughout this section.
4.9.2 Mass
The serviced spacecraft is formed by subtracting the mass of unnecessary components
and adding the mass of required components to the baseline spacecraft mass.
Fuel Tanks and Launched Fuel
This case requires substantial changes in the fuel tank mass and volume.  As the satellite
does not have to perform its own OR maneuver, the fuel tanks associated with this
function are removed.   Although the satellite must maintain its ability to do EWSK and
NSSK maneuvers, the baseline fuel tanks associated with these functions must be
removed to accommodate the added EP fuel tanks.  
The approach to determining the mass between the baseline and AQR 5 satellite is to
subtract the entire baseline fuel tank, which accounts for OR, NSSK, and EWSK fuel
storage, and add the fuel tank and fuel associated with a lifetime of Xenon fuel for NSSK
and EWSK maneuvers.  The baseline fuel tank mass is included in the total biprop system
mass that is deleted from the baseline satellite.   The mass of the EP fuel tanks is included
in the mass of the entire EP system that is added to the satellite.  This mass is found using
the mass of the fuel itself and a ratio of tank mass to fuel mass. 
In order to calculate the mass of the Xenon tanks, it is necessary to calculate the mass of
the Xenon fuel that is used to fill the fuel tanks.  To determine the mass of the fuel for
EWSK and NSSK, the rocket equation is used. 
The mass of the necessary NSSK and EWSK fuel/kg of spacecraft for the lifetime of the
spacecraft is
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where ∆V = (50.0 m/s/year)*(15 years) and Isp = 1507 sec.  This leads to Xenon fuel
masses of 75.0 kg and 155.1 kg and fuel tank masses of 9.0 kg and 18.6 kg for AQR 6a
and 6b, respectively. 
Pressurant Tanks
As the spacecraft in AQR 6 only perform stationkeeping maneuvers on their own, they do
not need the baseline helium pressurant tank.  Thus, the pressurant tank associated with
Program A is deleted from the baseline satellite in the process of forming the AQR 6
spacecraft.  This leads to a mass savings of 23 kg.
Propulsion System
The AQR 6 spacecraft relies on a tug for orbit raising and electric propulsion for
stationkeeping.  This eliminates the need for a biprop propulsion system.  To form the
new propulsion system, the baseline biprop system is deleted and an EP system is added.
The baseline biprop system has a mass of 100.9 kg and the EP system has a mass of
126.4 kg  (Pollard and Janson, 1996).
Docking and Refueling Mechanisms
As the AQR 6 spacecraft utilizes a tug vehicle to perform its OR maneuvers, it is
necessary to add docking capabilities to the baseline satellite.  Two sets of identical
docking mechanisms are added to the baseline satellite, to provide for adequate
redundancy.  Each of the docking/tug mechanisms has a mass of 16 kg.
Structural Savings
The majority of the fuel and fuel tank volume is deleted from the spacecraft.  Therefore, a
majority of the central cylinder can be removed.  In addition, a small amount of other
structural savings can be realized because the fuel tanks do not need to be supported
through the harsh launch environment.  This leads to a structural savings estimate of 12
and 10 kg for AQR 6a and b, respectively.   The slight difference between the structural
savings between the two cases arises because the AQR 6b spacecraft has a greater mass
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than the AQR 6a spacecraft.  This requires the 6b spacecraft to carry more Xenon for
stationkeeping.  This fuel must be supported through the harsh launch environment,
which requires slightly more structural support.
Launch Vehicle Capacity
As the AQR 6 spacecraft are launched directly to the staging orbit, there is a mass penalty
associated with this case.  The launch vehicle mass capacity to staging is 85% of the
capability to the baseline GTO.  The total mass capacity for Atlas IIAS to GTO is 3719
kg.. In addition, using one launch vehicle for two spacecraft requires an additional launch
vehicle adapter.  The mass of each adapter is assumed to be 100 kg.  This leads to a
single spacecraft mass capacity of 1480.6 kg and 3061.2 kg for AQR 6a and 6b,
respectively.
Results
After the components listed above and the launch vehicle capacity are taken into account,
a final ∆mass is found for both AQR 6a and b. The calculations for each case are shown
in Appendix A. 
 The ∆mass for AQR 6a is –172.5 kg.  The negative sign indicates that the final AQR 6a
spacecraft mass, before the addition or subtraction of transponders, is greater than the
launch vehicle capacity.  This occurs because AQR 6a requires two spacecraft on one
launch vehicle.  The effect of this is discussed further in the limiting factor analysis
section.  The ∆mass AQR 6b is 1316.4 kg.
4.9.3 Volume
The primary volume issue for the AQR 6a spacecraft is whether or not two redesigned
spacecraft can fit into one Atlas IIAS.  The primary issue for the AQR 6b satellite is the
amount of additional volume available for the addition of transponders. It is necessary to
calculate the changes in volume over the baseline satellite to solve these issues.  The
primary drivers of this change in volume are the fuel tanks and the pressurant tank.
These are discussed below. 
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Fuel Tanks
The approach used to account for the removal of part of the fuel tank is to delete the
standard baseline tank and add a Xenon tank with the capacity to hold a Xenon supply
capable of performing all EWSK and NSSK maneuvers over the life of the satellite.  The
volume of the standard fuel tank is found to be 1.9 m3  by multiplying its mass by the
volume per mass percentage.  Using the same method with the appropriate volume to
mass fraction for a Xenon tank, the volumes of the AQR 6a and b Xenon tanks are found
to be 0.044 and 0.090 m3, respectively.
Pressurant Tanks
As mentioned previously, the AQR 6 spacecraft do not need helium pressurant tanks.
Thus, the pressurant tank associated with Program A is deleted from the baseline satellite
in the process of forming the AQR 6 spacecraft.  This leads to a volume savings of 0.065
m3  for both 6a and b.
Launch Vehicle Capacity
The launch vehicle volume capacity is a concern for the AQR 6a spacecraft because two
spacecraft are being added to one launch vehicle.  Twice the AQR 6a spacecraft volume
is compared to the volume capacity of the Atlas IIAS fairing to determine that it is
possible to fit two of the redesigned spacecraft into one fairing.
The AQR 6b volume is not an issue, from the perspective of launch vehicle capacity,
because it is sized to have the same volume as the baseline satellite, which is known to fit
into the Atlas IIAS fairing.   
Result
After deleting the baseline fuel tanks and helium pressurant tanks and adding the Xenon
fuel tank for EWSK and NSSK fuel, the additional volume available for transponders is
1.77 m3  for AQR 6b.  It is assumed that no additional volume is available for the AQR 6a
spacecraft because the total volume of two AQR 6a satellites is greater than one baseline
satellite. 
 116
4.9.4 Spacecraft Cost
The ∆spacecraft cost, neglecting the cost of redesign and the cost of additional
transponders, is the cost of the electric propulsion system plus the cost of the docking
mechanisms, minus the cost of the biprop propulsion system and the savings associated
with the reduced structural needs.  This leads to a ∆spacecraft cost of $1.46 M for both
AQR 6a and b.  The positive sign indicates an increase in cost from the baseline case.
In addition, the costs of redesign for AQR 6a and b are assumed to be $40 M and $60 M,
amortized over 12 spacecraft, respectively.  This leads to a per spacecraft redesign cost of
$3.33 M and $5 M for 6a and b and total (spacecraft costs)  of $4.79 and $6.46 M,
respectively.
4.9.5 Launch Vehicle Cost
Unlike the (spacecraft cost), the cost of the launch vehicle per spacecraft differs
dramatically for AQR 6a and 6b.  In AQR 6a, because there are two spacecraft on one
launch vehicle, half of the cost of using an Atlas IIAS to launch to the staging orbit is
subtracted from the baseline launch cost to get a (launch cost) per spacecraft of -$43.9
M.  The negative sign indicates the spacecraft owner saves $43.9 M for each spacecraft. 
In AQR 6b the change in launch vehicle cost is calculated by subtracting the baseline
launch cost from the cost of using an Atlas IIAS to launch to staging orbit.  This is a $9.8
M increase in launch cost.
4.9.6 Limiting Factor Analysis
The limiting factor analysis is used for each case to determine the number of transponders
that must be subtracted or can be added to the baseline spacecraft, dependent upon the
constraints of the launch vehicle.  The two constraints analyzed are mass and volume.
After calculating the volume of the AQR 6a spacecraft and the useable fairing volume for
the launch vehicle to confirm that two AQR 6a spacecraft can fit onto an Atlas IIAS, it is
found that mass is the limiting factor in determining the number of additional
transponders.  In order to fit two spacecraft on an Atlas IIAS and to accommodate the
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electric propulsion system and fuel, it is necessary to reduce each spacecraft’s mass by
172.5 kg.  This requires the removal of 7 transponders. 
The AQR 6b spacecraft also has mass as its limiting factor.  However, unlike AQR 6a,
the AQR 6b spacecraft has an additional available mass of 1316 kg, which corresponds to
an additional 47 transponders.
4.9.7 Revenue and Cost
The final revenue and cost are found by taking into account the previously mentioned
changes as well as those associated with the change in the number of transponders from
the baseline case.
Cost
The total cost of the spacecraft and launch vehicle is calculated for each case by adding
the costs associated with the spacecraft, additional transponders, and the launch vehicle.
In AQR 6a the change in the cost associated with reducing the number of transponders by
7 is -$11.8 M.  Adding this change to the other cost changes gives a total cost decrease of
$50.9 M over the cost of the baseline satellite and launch.  This leads to a total spacecraft
and launch cost of $141.5 M.
In AQR 2b the cost associated with increasing the number of transponders on the
spacecraft by 47 is $79.1 M.  Adding this change to the other cost changes gives a total
cost increase of $95.3 M.  This leads to a total spacecraft and launch cost of $287.8 M.
Revenue
The total revenue/year is the baseline revenue/year plus the change in revenue/year.  The
change in revenue/year is proportional to the change in the number of transponders.  For
AQR 6a the decrease in revenue/year is $15.1 M.  This leads to a total revenue per year
of $88.6 M.  For AQR 6b the increase in revenue/year is $101.6 M, leading to a total
revenue per year of $205.3 M.
4.9.8 Discounted Cash Flow and Options
Using the revenue and cost numbers discussed above, NPVs for AQR 6a and b are
calculated using a DCF analysis.  NPVs of  $166.0 M and $411.8 M are found for AQR
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6a and b respectively, using revenues of $88.6 and $205.3 M/yr, total costs of $141.5 and
$287.8 M, and a discount rate of 10%. 
In addition to the NPV, the value of the option for life extension is calculated using the
method outlined in Section 4.3.11.  The options are found to have present values of $58.4
and $135.7 M, for AQR 6a and b, respectively.  The NPV and life extension option value
are summed for total present values of $224.4 and $547.5 M.
4.10 Comp 1:  Direct GEO Insertion with Electric
Propulsion for Stationkeeping
4.10.1 Description
This case examines the potential client’s perspective of the economic viability of using a
launch vehicle for Direct GEO Insertion and then performing all stationkeeping
maneuvers with electric propulsion (EP).  The satellite is launched directly to GEO where
it uses Xenon plasma thrusters to perform all of its own stationkeeping maneuvers.  This
case is interesting because it is the primary source of competition for servicing.  Many
believe that by using EP, one can gain all of the benefits of servicing (i.e. smaller fuel
tanks and thus, more capacity for transponders), without having to rely on another
spacecraft.  By comparing this case to the AQR cases, the validity of this statement is
tested.
While many of the AQR cases examine two distinct cases - one in which the costs are
reduced by launching two spacecraft on one launch vehicle and one in which the revenue
is increased by increasing the number of transponders on the spacecraft - only one case is
examined here:  the increased revenue case. This is because the reduced launch capacity
to GEO eliminates the possibility of launching two spacecraft on one launch vehicle,
without significantly reducing the number of revenue generating transponders onboard
such that the case becomes uneconomical.
4.10.2 Mass
The spacecraft is formed by subtracting the mass of unnecessary components and adding
the mass of required components to the baseline spacecraft mass.
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Fuel Tanks and Launched Fuel
This case requires substantial changes in the fuel tank mass and volume.  As the satellite
does not have to perform its own OR maneuver, the fuel tanks associated with this
function are removed.   Although the satellite must maintain its ability to do EWSK and
NSSK maneuvers, the baseline fuel tanks associated with these functions must be
removed to accommodate the added EP fuel tanks.  
The approach to determining the mass between the baseline and Comp 1 satellite is to
subtract the entire baseline fuel tank, which accounts for OR, NSSK, and EWSK fuel
storage, and add the fuel tank and fuel associated with a lifetime of Xenon fuel for NSSK
and EWSK maneuvers.  The baseline fuel tank mass is included in the total biprop system
mass that is deleted from the baseline satellite.   The mass of the EP fuel tanks is included
in the mass of the entire EP system that is added to the satellite.  This mass is found using
the mass of the fuel itself and a ratio of tank mass to fuel mass. 
In order to calculate the mass of the Xenon tanks, it is necessary to calculate the mass of
the Xenon fuel that is used to fill the fuel tanks.  The rocket equation is used to determine
the mass of the fuel for EWSK and NSSK.  The mass of the NSSK and EWSK fuel/kg of
spacecraft needed for the lifetime of the spacecraft is
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where ∆V = (50.0 m/s/year)*(15 years) and Isp = 1507 sec.  This leads to a Xenon fuel
tank mass of 16.6 kg. 
Pressurant Tanks
As the Comp 1 spacecraft, only performs stationkeeping maneuvers on its own, it does
not need the baseline helium pressurant tank.  Thus, the pressurant tank associated with
Program A is deleted from the baseline satellite in the process of forming the Comp 1
spacecraft.  This leads to a mass savings of 23 kg.
 120
Propulsion System
The Comp 1 spacecraft relies on the launch vehicle to get to GEO and electric propulsion
for stationkeeping.  This eliminates the need for a biprop propulsion system.  To form the
new propulsion system, the baseline biprop system is deleted and an EP system is added.
The baseline biprop system has a mass of 100.9 kg and the EP system has a mass of
126.4 kg.
Structural Savings
The baseline fuel tank volume is deleted from the spacecraft.  A much smaller Xenon
tank replaces it.  Therefore, a majority of the central cylinder can be removed.  In
addition, a small amount of other structural savings can be realized because the fuel tanks
do not need to be supported through the harsh launch environment.  This leads to a
structural savings estimate of 11 kg.   
Launch Vehicle Capacity
As the Comp 1 spacecraft is launched directly to GEO, there is a mass penalty associated
with this case.  The launch vehicle mass capacity to GEO is 76% of the capability to the
baseline GTO.  The total mass capacity for Atlas IIAS to GTO is 3719 kg.  After
accounting for the decreased launch capability and the mass of a 100-kg launch vehicle
adapter, this leads to a total launch vehicle mass capacity of 2726 kg.
Results
After the components listed above and the launch vehicle capacity are taken into account,
a final ∆mass is found for Comp 1. The calculations for each case are shown in Appendix
A.   The ∆mass for Comp 1 is 1094 kg. 
4.10.3 Volume
The primary volume issue for the Comp 1 spacecraft is the additional volume available
for transponders.  To determine this volume, it is necessary to calculate the change in
volume over the baseline satellite.  The primary drivers of this change are the substitution
of the biprop fuel tanks with a smaller Xenon tank and the deletion of the pressurant tank.
These are discussed below. 
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Fuel Tanks
The approach used to account for the removal of part of the fuel tank is to delete the
standard baseline tank and add a Xenon tank with the capacity to hold a Xenon supply
capable of sustaining all EWSK and NSSK maneuvers over the life of the satellite.  The
volume of the standard fuel tank is found to be 1.9 m3  by multiplying its mass by the
volume per mass percentage.  Using the same method with the appropriate volume to
mass fraction for a Xenon tank, the volume of the Comp 1 Xenon tank is found to be
0.080 m3.
Pressurant Tanks
As mentioned previously, the Comp 1 spacecraft does not need helium pressurant tanks.
Thus, the pressurant tank associated with Program A is deleted from the baseline satellite
in the process of forming the Comp 1 spacecraft.  This leads to a volume savings of 0.065
m3.
Launch Vehicle Capacity
The Comp 1 spacecraft volume is not an issue, from the perspective of launch vehicle
capacity, because it is sized to have the same volume as the baseline satellite, which is
known to fit into the Atlas IIAS fairing.   
Result
After deleting the baseline fuel tanks and helium pressurant tanks and adding the Xenon
fuel tank for EWSK and NSSK fuel, the additional volume available for transponders is
1.88 m3  for Comp 1. 
4.10.4 Spacecraft Cost
The ∆spacecraft cost, neglecting the cost of redesign and the cost of additional
transponders, is the cost of the electric propulsion system minus the cost of the biprop
propulsion system and the savings associated with the reduced structural needs.  This
leads to a ∆spacecraft cost of $0.96 M.  The positive sign indicates an increase in cost
from the baseline case.
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The cost of redesign for Comp 1 is assumed to be $60 M, amortized over 12 spacecraft.
This leads to a per spacecraft redesign cost of $5 M and a total (spacecraft cost) of
$5.96 M.
4.10.5 Launch Vehicle Cost
The change in launch vehicle cost is calculated by subtracting the baseline launch cost
from the cost of using an Atlas IIAS to launch directly to GEO.  It is assumed that 15%
increase in launch vehicle cost is incurred to account for launch vehicle modifications,
primarily to the vehicle software, necessary to change the final orbit from GTO to GEO.
This is a $14.6 M increase in launch cost.
4.10.6 Limiting Factor Analysis
The limiting factor analysis is used for each case to determine the number of transponders
that must be subtracted or can be added to the baseline spacecraft, dependent upon the
constraints of the launch vehicle.  The two constraints that are analyzed are mass and
volume.
The Comp 1 spacecraft also has mass as its limiting factor.  The Comp 1 spacecraft has
an additional available mass of 1094 kg, which corresponds to an additional 39
transponders.
4.10.7 Revenue and Cost
The final revenue and cost are found by taking into account the previously mentioned
changes as well as those associated with the change in the number of transponders from
the baseline case.
Cost
The total cost of the spacecraft and launch vehicle is calculated for each case by adding
the costs associated with the spacecraft, additional transponders, and the launch vehicle.
In Comp 1 the change in cost associated with increasing the number of transponders by
39 is $65.6 M.  Adding this change to the other cost changes gives a total cost increase of
$86.2 M over the cost of the baseline satellite and launch.  This leads to a total spacecraft
and launch cost of $278.7 M.
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Revenue
The total revenue/year is the baseline revenue/year plus the change in revenue/year.  The
change in revenue/year is proportional to the change in the number of transponders.  In
Comp 1 the increase in revenue/year is $84.3 M.  This leads to a total revenue per year of
$188.1 M.
4.10.8 Discounted Cash Flow and Options
Using the revenue and cost numbers discussed above, the NPV for Comp 1 is calculated
using a DCF analysis.  An NPV of  $368.2 M is found with a revenue of $188.1 M/yr, a
total cost of $278.7 M, and a discount rate of 10%.
4.11 Comp 2:  Launch to Staging Orbit and use Electric
Propulsion for Orbit Raising and Stationkeeping
4.11.1 Description
This case examines the potential client’s perspective of the economic viability of an
entirely EP-based propulsion system.  The satellite is launched to the staging orbit where
it then uses Xenon plasma thrusters to perform all of its own orbit raising and
stationkeeping maneuvers.  This case is interesting because it is the other primary source
of competition for servicing.  Many believe that by using EP, one can gain all of the
benefits of servicing (i.e. smaller fuel tanks and thus, more capacity for transponders),
without having to rely on another spacecraft.  By comparing this case to the AQR cases,
the validity of this statement is tested.  This case is also useful in determining whether it
is more economical to launch to staging and use EP for OR and SK or to use DGI and EP
only for stationkeeping, as in Comp 1.
Another aspect of this case is that using electric propulsion is a much slower means of
orbit raising.  This is important because the revenue stream for this case needs to be
shifted by the additional time it takes to get to GEO. 
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4.11.2 Mass
The spacecraft is formed by subtracting the mass of unnecessary components and adding
the mass of needed components to the baseline spacecraft mass.
Fuel Tanks and Launched Fuel
This case requires substantial changes in the fuel tank mass and volume.  Although the
satellite performs all of its own orbit raising and stationkeeping maneuvers, the baseline
fuel tanks associated with these functions must be removed to accommodate added EP
fuel tanks.  
The approach to determining the mass between the baseline and Comp 2 satellites is to
subtract the entire baseline fuel tank, which accounts for OR, NSSK, and EWSK fuel
storage, and add the fuel tank and fuel associated with a lifetime of Xenon fuel for orbit
raising, NSSK, and EWSK maneuvers.  The baseline fuel tank mass is included in the
total biprop system mass that is deleted from the baseline satellite.   The mass of the EP
fuel tanks is included in the mass of the entire EP system that is added to the satellite.
This mass is found using the mass of the fuel itself and a ratio of tank mass to fuel mass. 
In order to calculate the mass of the Xenon tanks, it is necessary to calculate the mass of
the Xenon fuel that is used to fill the fuel tanks.  The rocket equation is used to determine
the mass of the fuel for orbit raising, EWSK, and NSSK.  The mass of the total fuel/kg of
spacecraft needed for the lifetime of the spacecraft is
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where ∆V = 1800 m/s + (50.0 m/s/year)*(15 years)  and Isp = 1507 sec.  This leads to a
Xenon fuel tank mass of 69.3 kg. 
Pressurant Tanks
As the Comp 2 spacecraft, performs all of its maneuvers using its electric propulsion
system a separate pressurant tank is not necessary.  Thus, the pressurant tank associated
with Program A is deleted from the baseline satellite in the process of forming the Comp
2 spacecraft.  This leads to a mass savings of 23 kg.
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Propulsion System
The Comp 2 spacecraft relies solely on electric propulsion for its maneuvers.  This
eliminates the need for a biprop propulsion system.  To form the new propulsion system,
the baseline biprop system is deleted and an EP system is added.  The baseline biprop
system has a mass of 100.9 kg and the EP system has a mass of 126.4 kg.
Structural Savings
The baseline fuel tank volume is deleted from the spacecraft.  A much smaller Xenon
tank replaces it.  Therefore, a majority of the central cylinder can be removed.  In
addition, a small amount of other structural savings can be realized because the fuel tanks
do not need to be supported through the harsh launch environment.  This leads to a
structural savings estimate of 11 kg. 
Launch Vehicle Capacity
As the Comp 2 spacecraft is launched directly to the staging orbit, there is a mass penalty
associated with this case.  The launch vehicle mass capacity to staging is 85% of the
capability to the baseline GTO (Turner, Ref. 2, 2001).  The total mass capacity for Atlas
IIAS to GTO after accounting for the 100 kg adapter is 3619 kg.
Results
After the components listed above and the launch vehicle capacity are taken into account,
a final ∆mass is found for Comp 2. The calculations for each case are shown in Appendix
A.   The ∆mass for Comp 1 is 1481 kg. 
4.11.3 Volume
The primary volume issue for the Comp 1 spacecraft is the amount of additional volume
available for transponders.  In order to determine this volume, it is necessary to calculate
the change in volume over the baseline satellite.  The primary drivers of this change in
volume are the substitution of the biprop fuel tank with smaller a smaller Xenon tank and
the deletion of the pressurant tank.  These are discussed below. 
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Fuel Tanks
The approach used to account for the removal of a portion of the fuel tank is to delete the
standard baseline tank and add a Xenon tank with the capacity to hold a Xenon supply
capable of sustaining all orbit raising, EWSK, and NSSK maneuvers over the life of the
satellite.  The volume of the standard fuel tank is found to be 1.9 m3  by multiplying its
mass by the volume per mass percentage.  Using the same method with the appropriate
volume to mass fraction for a Xenon tank, the volume of the Comp 2 Xenon tank is found
to be 0.34 m3.
Pressurant Tanks
As mentioned previously, the Comp 2 spacecraft does not need helium pressurant tanks.
Thus, the pressurant tank associated with Program A is deleted from the baseline satellite
in the process of forming the Comp 2 spacecraft.  This leads to a volume savings of 0.065
m3.
Launch Vehicle Capacity
The Comp 2 volume is not an issue, from the perspective of launch vehicle capacity,
because it is sized to have the same volume as the baseline satellite, which is known to fit
into the Atlas IIAS fairing.   
Result
After deleting the baseline fuel tanks and helium pressurant tanks and adding the Xenon
fuel tank for the orbit raising, EWSK, and NSSK fuel, the additional volume available for
transponders is 1.05 m3  for Comp 2. 
4.11.4 Spacecraft Cost
The ∆spacecraft cost, neglecting the cost of redesign and the cost of additional
transponders, is the cost of the electric propulsion system minus the cost of the biprop
propulsion system and the savings associated with the reduced structural needs.  This
leads to a ∆spacecraft cost of $0.96 M.  The positive sign indicates an increase in cost
from the baseline case.
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Additionally, the cost of redesign for Comp 2 is assumed to be $60 M, amortized over 12
spacecraft.  This leads to a per spacecraft redesign cost of $5 M and a total (spacecraft
cost) of $5.96 M.
4.11.5 Launch Vehicle Cost
There is no change in the launch vehicle cost from the baseline case because the Comp 2
spacecraft uses the Atlas IIAS launch vehicle to launch to GTO.
4.11.6 Limiting Factor Analysis
The limiting factor analysis is used for each case to determine the number of transponders
that must be subtracted or can be added to the baseline spacecraft, dependent upon the
constraints of the launch vehicle.  The two constraints analyzed are mass and volume.
The Comp 2 spacecraft has volume as its limiting factor.  The Comp 2 spacecraft has an
additional available volume of 1.05 m3, which corresponds to 46 additional transponders.
4.11.7 Revenue and Cost
The final revenue and cost are found by taking into account the previously mentioned
changes as well as those associated with the change in the number of transponders from
the baseline case.
Cost
The total cost of the spacecraft and launch vehicle is calculated for each case by adding
the costs associated with the spacecraft, additional transponders, and the launch vehicle.
In Comp 2 the change in the cost associated with increasing the number of transponders
by 46 is $77.4 M.  Adding this change to the other cost changes gives a total cost increase
of $83.3 M over the cost of the baseline satellite and launch.  This leads to a total
spacecraft and launch cost of $275.8 M.
Revenue
The total revenue/year is the baseline revenue/year plus the change in revenue/year.  The
change in revenue/year is proportional to the change in the number of transponders.  In
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Comp 2 the increase in revenue/year is $99.4 M.  This leads to a total revenue per year of
$203.2 M.
4.11.8 Discounted Cash Flow and Options
Using the revenues and costs discussed above, the NPV for Comp 2 is calculated using a
DCF analysis.  As using EP for orbit raising increases the time to GEO by approximately
30 days, the satellite will be unable to provide services to its clients until 30 days after a
satellite that utilizes biprop for orbit raising.  Thus, its revenues must be shifted by 30
days to account for the increased time for orbit raising.    Taking the shifted revenues into
account, an NPV of  $408.7 M is found with a revenue of $203.2 M/yr, a total cost of
$275.8 M, and a discount rate of 10%.
4.12 Results and Discussion
Six Aquarius servicing cases and two competition cases are analyzed and presented
individually.  This section illustrates the results of each of the cases and how they
compare to each other. 
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Table 4-3 Value of Satellite Servicing from Client Perspective
Case #
Redesign
Costs
(amortized over
12 s/c)
($M)
Total S/C
and Launch
Cost before
Servicing
Charges
($M)
Revenue/yr
($M)
Project
NPV after
redesign
costs ($M)
Life
Extension
Option
Value ($M)
Total
Present
Value ($M)
Baseline 0 192.5 103.8 179.3 - 179.3
AQR 1a 40 146.3 90.78 169.4 59.9 229.3
AQR 2a 40 149.4 101.6 198.3 67.0 265.3
AQR 2b 60 300.6 224.8 459.6 148.7 608.3
AQR 3 60 280.3 198.9 395.1 131.5 526.6
AQR 4 60 288.7 194.5 380.6 128.7 509.3
AQR 5 60 285.3 190.2 370.3 125.9 496.2
AQR 6a 40 141.5 88.6 166 58.4 224.4
AQR 6b 60 287.8 205.3 411.8 135.7 547.5
AQR 7 60 350.5 181.6 307.8 - 307.8
Comp 1 60 278.7 188.1 368.2 - 368.2
Comp 2 60 275.8 203.2 412.8 - 408.7

It is interesting to note that before servicing costs are taken into account, all of the
servicing cases, as well as the competition cases, have higher total present values than the
baseline case.  This indicates that both satellite servicing and electric propulsion provide
economic benefit to the client spacecraft. 
Based solely on the information provided in Table 4-3, the best means of servicing a
satellite, from the client’s economic perspective, is AQR 2b, utilizing a tug vehicle for
both OR and NSSK.  This allows for the most additional transponders to be added to the
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spacecraft for the least cost, providing the highest total present value for the client
spacecraft.26 
In order to determine the client’s preferred method of servicing, it is necessary to also
consider her confidence in the reliability of servicing (See Section 4.3.1).  Although AQR
2b provides the greatest economic value for the client, it requires the client to be
completely reliant upon the provider.  AQR 4, 5, and 6b have lower total present values,
but they require less reliance on the provider.  Depending on the technical risk aversion
of the client, the client may prefer these cases to AQR 2b.
Although the cases that present the greatest economic benefit to the client are servicing
cases, as the client determines her confidence in the reliability of servicing, she may
decide to forgo the added benefit of servicing over the competition cases because EP may
provide less risk.  As the risk of EP versus servicing is out of the scope of this thesis, it
will not be considered throughout the remainder of the servicing analysis.  However, EP
remains the primary competition for servicing, and as such its client NPV will be
considered in the process of determining the amount a client is willing to pay for
servicing.
The numbers presented above do not take into account the value of the option to relocate
the spacecraft over a more profitable market.  This value is believed to be comparable the
value of life extension.  However, as the value of the option to relocate is dependent upon
many factors that are specific to a particular spacecraft mission (see Section 4.3.12), it is
not included in the generalized analysis presented in this thesis.
4.13 Conclusions
This chapter presents both the economic and technical issues associated with potential
satellite servicing configurations.  The client’s economic value of servicing and the
technical issues associated with each are presented.
A potential client, needs to consider both the economic and technological aspects of each
of the cases before determining which servicing configuration, if any, is best for her
                                               
26
 This is before the costs of servicing are taken into account.  These costs are discussed in the next chapter.
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purposes.  The client also needs to consider electric propulsion as a means of receiving
the benefits that satellite servicing provides, namely increasing mass and volume
available to transponders, with potentially less technical risk.
From a purely economic view, the client spacecraft gains more by utilizing satellite
servicing than electric propulsion.  Of the servicing cases, the largest NPV is earned by
building the AQR 2b spacecraft, a satellite that utilizes a tug for both orbit raising and
North-South stationkeeping. 
From a purely technical standpoint, there are many trades that need to be performed to
determine the risk associated with each servicing approach.  The technical feasibility of
frequent dockings, tugs, and refuelings needs to be investigated.  However, it is
reasonable to assume that the client prefers to minimize her dependence on the servicing
spacecraft.   Given more information about the technical risk associated with each
servicing approach, a potential client can determine which servicing case is “best” based
upon the risk she is willing to incur to maximize her NPV. 
The analysis presented in this chapter indicates the viability of the satellite servicing
market from the client’s perspective.  Based on current knowledge, by considering both
the technical and economic issues, best configuration for the client spacecraft is AQR 5.
This case has a significant increase in NPV over the baseline case and has minimal
interactions with the servicing spacecraft. (less than one time per year).
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Chapter 5.   Satellite Servicing:
Provider Value Analysis
5.1 Introduction
This chapter uses the information and insights gained from the satellite servicing analysis
in Chapter 4 to demonstrate the process of estimating the value of satellite servicing to
the provider. The estimated values for each case are then compared to determine the
proper servicing architecture. 
First, the purpose and approach of this analysis is presented.  Next, the analysis itself,
including a sensitivity analysis, is shown.  Finally, conclusions about the viability of the
servicing market and the proper system architecture are presented.
5.2 Purpose
It is important to recognize that the market must provide economic benefit to the provider
as well as to the client.  If it does not, the provider will be unwilling to provide satellite
servicing to the client.  While the focus of many valuations is the cost of providing the
service or product, this thesis highlights the importance of valuing the technology from
the client’s perspective, as well.  However, in doing so, it is important that the provider’s
costs are not neglected.  Otherwise, the valuation would only examine one side of the
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coin, just as current valuations do when they only consider the problem from the
provider’s (or cost) perspective.  
The purpose of this analysis is to find:
• The revenue stream to the provider from satellite servicing based upon the
client’s economic benefit
• The necessary architecture to support this servicing approach
• The costs associated with each servicing approach
• The viability of the satellite servicing market using the revenue stream,
necessary architectures and their associated costs based on value to the
provider
System architecture selection is driven by both economics and technical analysis.   If one
lets the system architecture be driven by the technical aspects alone, it is very likely that
the final product will be technically impressive, but unable to fulfill the needs of the
market it is attempting to capture.  On the other hand, if the architecture is driven solely
by economics it is possible that the system will run into technical obstacles along the way
that were not properly accounted for up front.  Thus, in addition to the economic analysis,
the technological risks associated with each servicing case and its associated servicing
architecture are considered in the final analysis.
5.3 Approach
To determine the economic viability of a market, it is necessary to consider the price a
client is willing to pay and the costs associated with the necessary architecture to provide
the service.  These are discussed below, followed by a discussion of the discounted cash
flow analysis used to determine the servicing provider’s NPV for each servicing
architecture.
5.3.1 Estimating Potential Revenues from Servicing
Estimating the servicing market’s potential revenues requires estimating the price a client
is willing to pay to have her/his satellite serviced and the number of satellites that will use
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this service.  This price estimate is made by comparing the competition cases to the
baseline case to determine which provides the most economic benefit to the client.  This
information is used to find the difference between the NPV of the servicing case and the
client’s next best option, which determines the value servicing provides.  A portion of
this value is the price that a client is willing to pay to have her/his satellite serviced.  To
estimate the number of satellites whose owners will be willing to pay for servicing
requires using market forecasts for GEO commercial satellites.
In addition to the revenue estimations, it is very important to determine when the
provider is actually paid for its services (i.e. the time at which the revenue is generated).
Due to the time value of money, the timing of the revenue has a significant impact on the
final NPV calculation. 
5.3.2 Estimating Cost of Servicing
In addition to estimating the revenue stream a given architecture, it is important to
investigate its associated costs.  A set of estimates for the cost of each architecture is
presented below.  These values are not meant to be accurate representations of the costs
associated with each architecture, rather they are included to demonstrate how they are to
be used with the revenues to determine the provider’s NPV.
To estimate the cost of servicing for each case, one must investigate the cost of the on-
orbit architecture, its associated launch costs, the costs of fuel delivery, and its operations
costs.  The servicing cases are broken into three classes based upon their on-orbit
architectures to facilitate the estimation of spacecraft and launch costs.  The fuel delivery
costs are calculated as a function of the amount of fuel necessary for each serviced
satellite and when the fuel is delivered.  The operations costs are estimated to be a
percentage of the revenues generated by the provider. 
The development costs, in terms of the refueling and docking interfaces, are assumed to
be small.  Although there will inevitably be some development costs incurred by a
servicing provider, much of the technology is currently being developed by groups
funded by government agencies (see Section 2.4.2).
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In addition to the actual cost amounts, it is very important to determine when each of the
costs is incurred.  Due to the effects of discounting, the timing of each of the costs has a
significant impact on the final NPV calculation.  Each of the costs and their associated
timing is discussed below in Section 5.4.2.
5.3.3 Discounted Cash Flow to Determine Provider’s NPV
After the revenues and costs associated with each case are determined, a discounted cash
flow analysis is used to calculate the servicing provider’s NPV for each case.   The DCF
analysis is based upon industry driven assumptions of the financing of current aerospace
projects.27   It includes taxes, depreciation, debt and equity financing, interest expenses,
and satellite operating costs.  The model is set up such that the primary inputs are
servicing revenue and servicing costs (including architecture and fuel delivery costs) with
their appropriate timing.  The model’s primary output is an NPV based on a given
discount rate.  For the purposes of this analysis the following assumptions are made:
• Corporate tax rate = 40%
• Loan amount = 80% of cash needed
• Capital Expenditure depreciated over lifetime of servicing architecture (15 years)
• Interest rate = 10%
• Spacecraft and launch costs are paid evenly during two years before launch date
• Operating Expenses = 10% of gross revenue generated per year
• Discount rate = 10% (this number is varied to show sensitivity to cost of capital)
5.3.4 Break-Even Analysis
In addition to the DCF analysis, a break-even analysis is performed to determine the
maximum servicing architecture cost for which the servicing provider would still be
willing to take on the project.  This occurs when NPV is slightly positive.  The analysis is
                                               
27
   The DCF analysis is a modified version of an analysis used by the finance group at Space
Systems/LORAL to value satellite projects.
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performed using the DCF analysis and the assumptions listed above.  The servicing
architecture cost is varied until an NPV of approximately zero is found.
This analysis is important because the cost estimates used in the DCF analysis are just
that - estimates.  The break-even analysis allows the servicing provider to make her own
estimate of the cost of a servicing architecture and to compare it with the break-even cost.
It also allows the potential provider to better understand what her cost constraints are.
5.4 Analysis
5.4.1 Estimating Potential Revenues from Servicing
Estimating the potential revenues generated from servicing requires an analysis of the
“value” servicing provides to its clients as well as the number of spacecraft that a given
architecture will service.  The majority of the client value analysis is presented in Chapter
4.  The information from that analysis is used to determine how it affects the servicing
provider in terms of how much a client is willing to pay to have her spacecraft serviced.
To round out the revenue picture, an estimate is made of the number of spacecraft that
will use servicing.
Price Estimation for Servicing
To determine the price a client is willing to pay requires deciding what her next best
option is.  As addressed previously, the competition cases are economically more
attractive to a potential client than the current spacecraft design (the baseline case).  Thus,
the “value” of servicing is the difference between the economic value (i.e. NPV) of each
of the servicing cases and Comp 1. 
Unfortunately, comparing the total NPVs against each other does not directly take into
consideration the difference in costs incurred to generate those NPVs.  Nor does it
directly factor in the fact that there are different numbers of transponders on board each
case’s spacecraft in each case.  A means of solving both of these issues is to normalize
each case’s NPV with its respective number of transponders and then to compare the
NPV difference per transponder.  This is the approach taken to estimate the price a client
would be willing to pay for servicing.
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Using the total present values presented in Section 4.12, the differences in total present
value (standard NPV + value of option to extend spacecraft life) between each of the
cases and Comp 1, are calculated and then multiplied by the number of transponders for
that respective case.
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It is important to recognize that the price a client is willing to pay for servicing is
between $0 and the “value” calculated above.  For the purposes of this study it is
assumed that this value is split evenly between the provider and the client.  Thus, the
NPV of the price a client is willing to pay to have his/her satellite serviced is 50% of the
above-calculated value.
In addition to the NPV of the price of servicing, it is important to determine when the
provider generates these revenues.  Each case is considered individually to determine
when it is serviced does this, as that is the approximate time the client would pay for the
servicing. 
For AQR 1a and AQR 6a and b, the only interaction with the provider occurs right after
launch (i.e. year 1).  Thus, the client will pay the entire price in year 1.  AQR 2a and b
has a significant portion of the servicing performed in year 1.  The rest of the servicing is
spread evenly throughout the spacecraft’s lifetime.  This leads to 50% of the NPV being
paid in year 1 and 50% being spread out over the life of the spacecraft.  AQR 3, 4, and 5
have servicing needs that are evenly distributed throughout their lifetimes, which leads to
evenly distributing the NPV of the servicing price over the spacecraft lifetime.  In
addition to deciding when the provider is paid in each case, the time value of money is
taken into account when the actual servicing price is calculated by forecasting the price
over the 15-year lifetime and discounting it back to year 0 to confirm that the discounted
value of the revenues generated by the provider match the initial NPV of the servicing
price.  The calculated servicing NPVs and their respective servicing price and timing are
shown in Table 5-1.
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Table 5-1  Price Client is Willing to Pay for Servicing
Servicing Case
NPV of Servicing Price
over S/C Lifetime
Servicing Price
($M, after
discounting) When is Servicer  Paid?
AQR 1a 14.62 14.62 100% Year 1
AQR 2a 23.28 13.30, 1.66/yr 50% Year 1, 50% over lifetime
AQR 2b 88.28 50.45, 6.3058/yr 50% Year 1, 50% over lifetime
AQR 3 69.85 9.18/yr 100% over lifetime
AQR 4 64.97 8.537/yr 100% over lifetime
AQR 5 62.11 8.161/yr 100% over lifetime
AQR 6a 14.02 14.02 100% Year 1
AQR 6b 74.73 74.73 100% Year 1

Market Forecasts
After determining the price the client is willing to pay and its associated timing, it is
necessary to determine how many spacecraft will utilize servicing.  It is estimated that
one servicing architecture can service 12 spacecraft (Turner, Ref. 4, 2001).  Although
each of the different servicing architectures may be able to support a different number of
clients, it is assumed that each architecture services 12 spacecraft.  To determine if the
commercial GEO market be able to accommodate this number of spacecraft in the future,
it is necessary to look at market forecasts.
Many firms and agencies attempt to forecast the number of satellites that will be launched
over the next few years.  A forecast of an average of approximately 30 spacecraft
launched per year until 2010 (Commercial Space Transportation Forecasts, 2001) fits
well with both historical data (“Space Launch Roundup,” 2001) and predicted future
satellite demands.   These predictions indicate that there is a viable market for 12 serviced
GEO spacecraft, from a quantity standpoint.
In addition to simply predicting the number of spacecraft being launched, the forecasts
examine the trends in satellite mass.  Over the past several years, as indicated by their
masses, satellites have been increasing in size.  It appears that this trend is not going to
change in the foreseeable future (Space Launch Roundup,” 2001).  The upward trend in
satellite mass indicates an increase in satellite capacity and coverage over time
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(Commercial Space Transportation Forecasts, 2001).  Along with the number of
spacecraft forecast, the trends towards increasing capability and coverage indicate that
the commercial GEO market should absorb 12 serviced spacecraft, with an increased
number of transponders, without a decrease in the amount of revenue each transponder
generates.  However, it is unlikely that this market would, in the near-term, support two
on-orbit architectures (24 serviced spacecraft), as that would amount to 80% of the entire
predicted GEO market.
5.4.2 Estimating Costs of Servicing
The costs of servicing include the on-orbit architecture and its launch costs, fuel delivery
costs, and operations costs.  Each of these is discussed below.
Architecture costs
To estimate the cost of each architecture, the architectures associated with each AQR
case are separated into groups that have the same on-orbit architectures.  The groups,
their on-orbit architectures, and estimated costs are presented in Table 5-2.
Table 5-2 Architecture Groups and Associated Cost Estimates
Architecture
Group
Cases Basic Servicing
Architecture
Cost Estimate
A AQR 1
AQR 6
1 Orbital Transfer Vehicle
between LEO and Staging,
1 Servicing Spacecraft and
Fuel Storage Facility at
Staging Orbit
Spacecraft: $100 M
Storage Facility: $5 M
Launches: $94.5 M
Total: $199 M
B AQR 2 1 Orbital Transfer Vehicle
between LEO and Staging,
1 Orbital Transfer Vehicle
between Staging and GEO,
1 Servicing Spacecraft and
Fuel Storage Facility at
Both Staging and GEO
Orbits
Spacecraft: $200M
Storage Facilities: $10 M
Launches: $144 M
Total: $354 M

C AQR 3
AQR 4
AQR 5

1 Orbital Transfer Vehicle
between LEO and GEO,
1 Servicing Spacecraft and
Fuel Storage Facility at
GEO Orbit
Spacecraft: $100 M
Storage Facility: $5 M
Launches:$94.5 M
Total: $199 M
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The costs listed in Table 5-2 are derived from the following estimations:
• Orbital transfer vehicle (OTV):  $50 M
• Servicing spacecraft: $50 M
• On orbit fuel storage facility:  $5 M
• Launch on Delta 2:  $45 M to LEO, $49.5 M to staging
The orbital transfer vehicle and servicing spacecraft costs are estimated by assuming they
are small satellites, on the order of 500 kg (Turner, Ref. 4, 2001), with medium
complexity (Bearden, 2001).  A single on-orbit storage facility is assumed to be $5 M.28
The launch cost for a Delta 2 to LEO is $45 M (Isakowitz, 1999).  A 10% increase in cost
is assumed for launches to the staging orbit.  The total launch costs are derived using the
above launch costs and the number of launches as illustrated in Table 5-3.
Table 5-3 Necessary Launches for Each Servicing Architecture Group
Architecture
Group
Launches Spacecraft and Storage Facilities on
Launch
1 Delta 2 to LEO

LEO to Staging OTVA
1 Delta 2 to Staging Staging Servicing Spacecraft and Fuel
Storage Facility
1 Delta 2 to LEO LEO to Staging OTV and Staging Fuel
Storage Facility (tugged to Staging by OTV)
1 Delta 2 to Staging Staging to GEO OTV and Staging Servicing
Spacecraft
B
1 Delta 2 to Staging GEO Servicing Vehicle and Fuel Storage
Facility
1 Delta 2 to LEO LEO to GEO OTVC
1 Delta 2 to Staging GEO Servicing Spacecraft and Fuel Storage
Facility

For a visual representation of each architecture, refer to Figure 5-1, 
                                               
28
 This estimate is from a Space Systems/LORAL employee who works on possible servicing architectures.
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Figure 5-2, and Figure 5-3.  From these illustrations, it is clear why architecture B is so
much more expensive than the other two architectures.
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Figure 5-1 Servicing Architecture A
Figure 5-2  Servicing Architecture B
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Figure 5-3  Servicing Architecture C
Fuel delivery costs
The cost of fuel delivery for each case is estimated by finding the amount of fuel a single
client spacecraft needs in each orbit (i.e. staging or GEO), multiplying this number by the
number of spacecraft serviced by one servicing architecture, and adding the cost of fuel
for the servicing vehicle to transfer between the client spacecraft.  As discussed above, it
is very important to know the timing of the fuel delivery costs.  These times are included
in the analysis, as well.
The mass of the fuel a single client spacecraft (and its tug vehicle if appropriate) needs
over the course of its lifetime is calculated using the equations presented in the fuel tanks
discussion of Section 4.3.3. 
The cost of fuel delivery is assumed to be $13.6 K/kg to staging and $30 K/kg to GEO.29 
Although these numbers are derived assuming the use of a low cost launch vehicle, such
as Aquarius, the cost to GEO is not unreasonable compared to current launch costs.30 
                                               
29
 These numbers were generated using software developed by Space Systems/Loral.
30
 The specific cost to GEO for the Atlas IIAS vehicle is $34 K. 
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After calculating the mass of the fuel to be delivered and multiplying it by the delivery
costs, the following costs are found  (See Table 5-4).
Table 5-4  Fuel Delivery Costs For Client Maneuvers Per Client Spacecraft
Servicing Case
Cost of Client Fuel
Delivery in Year 1 ($M)
Cost of Client Fuel
Delivery per Year
over Lifetime ($M)
AQR 1a 37.6 -
AQR 2a 33.4 1.0
AQR 2b 60.1 1.9
AQR 3 1.7 1.7
AQR 4 1.5 1.5
AQR 5 1.5 1.5
AQR 6a 32.4 -
AQR 6b 58.3 -

In addition to the fuel costs listed above, there are fuel delivery costs associated with the
fuel necessary to maneuver the servicing spacecraft between the client satellites.  These
support costs are estimated using the mass of the fuel needed per client spacecraft for the
provider to maneuver between and dock with the spacecraft and the fuel storage facility,
multiplied by the delivery cost/kg of propellant at GEO.
The fuel necessary to maneuver between and dock with the client and the fuel storage
facility is 4.35 kg/client per docking.31   This number is multiplied by the number of
docking operations per year to determine the total mass of the fuel needed for the
servicer.  The fuel mass multiplied by the fuel delivery cost, leads to support costs below.
(See Table 5-5)

                                               
31
 This number is found by estimating the total annual fuel used by a servicing vehicle that performs all
NSSK maneuvers for a spacecraft and services 12 spacecraft and dividing it by 12 spacecraft and the
number of times it has to dock with one spacecraft/year.
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Table 5-5 Fuel Delivery Costs for Support Maneuvers Per Client Spacecraft
Servicing Case
Cost of Support Fuel
Delivery in Year 1 ($M)
Cost of Support
Fuel Delivery per
Year over Lifetime
($M)
AQR 1a 0.1 -
AQR 2a 1.3 1.2
AQR 2b 1.2 1.2
AQR 3 1.2 1.2
AQR 4 1.2 1.2
AQR 5 0.1 0.1
AQR 6a 0.1 -
AQR 6b 0.1 -

The costs in Table 5-4 and Table 5-5 are summed to get the total fuel delivery cost per
client spacecraft.
Operations costs
The operations costs for each case are estimated to be 10% of gross revenues.  Since the
revenues scale with the number of clients as well as the value of the revenues for each
client, the operations costs scale with these variables as well.  This is expected from
operations costs because the more clients the provider has to service and the more
valuable each client is, the more expensive operations costs will be.
5.4.3 Discounted Cash Flow to Determine Provider’s NPV
After calculating the above revenues and costs, these numbers are used as inputs in a
DCF analysis.  The purpose of this analysis is to determine the servicing provider’s NPV.
Using a discount rate of 10% and the other assumptions presented in Section 5.3.3, the
following NPVs are found. (See Table 5-6)
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Table 5-6 Servicing Provider’s NPV
Servicing
Case
Servicing Revenue
Year 1, Year 2-15
(Table 5-1)
 ($M)
Cost of
Servicing
Architecture
(Table 5-2)
 ($M)
Cost of Fuel
Delivery in
Year 1
(Tables 5-4
and 5-5)
($M)
Cost of Fuel
Delivery per
Year over
Lifetime
(Tables 5-4
and 5-5)
($M)
Provider
NPV
($M)
AQR 1a 14.6,   0/yr 199.5 37.7 - -397.7
AQR 2a 13.3, 1.7/yr 354.0 34.6 2.2 -561.2
AQR 2b 50.5, 6.3/yr 354.0 61.3 3.0 -280.4
AQR 3 9.2, 9.2/yr 199.5 2.9 2.9 95.7
AQR 4 8.5, 8.5/yr 199.5 2.7 2.7 80.3
AQR 5 8.2, 8.2/yr 199.5 1.6 1.6 109.0
AQR 6a 14.2,   0/yr 199.5 32.4 - -355.4
AQR 6b 74.7,   0/yr 199.5 58.3 - -103.5

5.4.4 Break-Even Analysis
The break-even analysis is performed using the revenue and fuel delivery costs listed in
Table 5-6.  The following servicing architecture costs are the break-even costs for the
servicing provider.  (See Table 5-7)
Table 5-7 Break-Even Analysis for Servicing Provider
Servicing Case
Architecture cost for
which NPV = 0
($M)
AQR 1a negative
AQR 2a negative
AQR 2b 22.4
AQR 3 358.8
AQR 4 332.9
AQR 5 381
AQR 6a negative
AQR 6b 62.3

As shown in Table 5-7, some of the break-even costs are negative.  This indicates that
there is no cost at which the servicing provider would take on this project, for the given
set of assumptions.  In fact, an outside party would actually have to give the provider the
on orbit architecture and then pay the provider more than the estimated revenues to make
this an economically attractive project for the provider.
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5.4.5 Sensitivity Analysis
A sensitivity analysis is presented here to demonstrate the sensitivity of the servicing
provider’s NPV to each of the inputs into the DCF analysis, as well as to the discount
rate. The baseline inputs for the sensitivity analysis are presented in Table 5-6.
Revenues:  Percentage of client’s NPV client is willing to pay for servicing
The owner of the client spacecraft is willing to pay between $0 and the total “value”
servicing provides them to the servicing provider for their spacecraft to be serviced.  In
the DCF analysis presented above, it is assumed that the client is willing to pay the
provider 50% of their increased value due to servicing.  To determine the sensitivity of
the DCF analysis to this percentage, each of the cases is examined using 25% and 75%.
The results are presented in Figure 5-4.


Figure 5-4  Sensitivity of Provider’s NPV to % of Client’s Value Paid to Provider
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Figure 5-4 demonstrates several important issues.  First, no cases are viable if the
servicing revenue is less than 32% of the client’s value for servicing.  Second, two of the
cases, AQR 2b and 6b, become economically viable at 73% and 65%, respectively.
 It is also interesting to note that AQR 1a, 2a, and 6a are the only cases that are linear.
(Although the other cases may appear linear on this graph, they are slightly non-linear.)
This occurs because the provider revenue associated with each of these cases is much
lower than any of the other cases.  Due to the effects of taxes in the DCF model, cases
that generate very little revenue do not receive as much of a tax shield because they have
fewer revenues to shield.  This effect leads to non-linearities in the cases that generate
more revenue.  Lower revenues also lead to smaller changes in the provider’s NPV when
the percentage value is changed.  This is confirmed by examining the slope of the lines.
Servicing Architecture Costs
Spacecraft costs are very difficult to estimate.  Even with the most sophisticated
estimation tools, programs often incur cost over-runs.  To demonstrate the sensitivity of
the servicing architecture costs to the provider’s NPV, each of the cases is examined
using a 50% increase and a 25% decrease in total servicing architecture cost.  The results
are presented in Figure 5-5.  A 50% decrease in cost was not examined as it seems out of
the realm of possibility for these architectures.
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Figure 5-5 Sensitivity of Provider NPV to Servicing Architecture Cost
As can be seen in Figure 5-5, the servicing provider’s NPV has a linear relationship with
the servicing architecture cost.  The figure also illustrates that the provider’s NPV is quite
sensitive to the architecture cost.  Although this is an expected result, it highlights the
importance of having an accurate cost estimate. 
Fuel Delivery Costs
Just as spacecraft costs are difficult to accurately predict, fuel delivery costs are also hard
to estimate.  In this analysis, they depend on the design, manufacturing, and operating
costs of Aquarius, or another low-cost launch vehicle.  As these costs are a significant
portion of the cost of servicing and have high uncertainty due to the technical risks
associated with developing a low-cost launch vehicle, the sensitivity of the provider’s
NPV to the fuel delivery costs is examined using a 50% increase and decrease in these
costs.
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Figure 5-6  Sensitivity of Servicing Provider’s NPV to Fuel Delivery Costs
As expected, the servicing provider’s NPV decreases as the fuel delivery costs increase.
It is interesting to note that the servicing architectures that have positive NPVs with the
original fuel delivery costs, continue to have positive NPVs, even with a 50% increase in
fuel delivery costs.  The architectures with positive NPVs are the cases that require fuel
delivery only in GEO.  Thus, these cases are still viable if the fuel delivery launch vehicle
used is the Atlas IIAS instead of Aquarius, because the cost difference of fuel delivery is
less than the 50% increase assumed in the sensitivity analysis.
Additionally, AQR 2b and 6b become economically feasible (i.e. they have positive
NPVs) when the fuel delivery costs are decreased by 50%. 
Discount Rate
The discount rate of a project is a very important aspect of the project’s valuation.
Generally, the determination of the viability of a project, based on the NPV, is
significantly affected by the discount rate.  As aerospace projects are generally
discounted at approximately 10% (“Cost of Capital by Sector,” 2001), only one other
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discount rate, 15%, is used for comparison.  This discount rate is carried through the
entire analysis, from determining the client’s NPV associated with each case, to the
servicing provider’s NPV calculations.  The results are shown in Figure 5-7.

Figure 5-7  Sensitivity of Provider’s NPV to Discount Rate
Increasing the discount rate has, at first glance, unexpected results.  In general, when the
discount rate is increased, NPV decreases.  This is because discounting future cash flows
with a higher discount rate decreases their present value.  However, in the cases, AQR 1a,
2a, 2b, and 6a, the NPV actually increases with an increased discount rate.  This is
because these cases have negative NPVs when discounted at 10%.  Thus, when the
discount rate is increased, the negative cash flows (i.e. costs) are discounted backward
and become smaller in magnitude, increasing the overall NPV.
Also unexpected is the lack of sensitivity of AQR 3, 4, and 5 to the discount rate.  This
happens because the potential client’s cases are also discounted at 15%.  Although this
decreases the client’s NPVs , the normalized difference between each case and Comp 1
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(the NPV of the provider’s revenues) remains nearly constant.  This leads to only a slight
decrease in provider NPV for each of these 3 cases.  
5.5 Conclusions
This chapter completes the economic picture of a potential servicing market by using the
information from Chapter 4, the client’s perspective on servicing, to determine if there is
a potential market for servicing.  In addition, if this market exists, it examines what the
proper system architecture is and what the provider stands to gain by building this
architecture.
The servicing architecture that provides the most economic benefit to the provider is
AQR 5, where the serviced satellite is inserted directly into GEO by the launch vehicle
and utilizes a refueling satellite to be refueled approximately once per year.  The AQR 5
configuration is also the best case from the perspective of the client, after taking into
account the technical and economic aspects associated with the case.  This indicates there
is a market for servicing and that the proper system architecture is Architecture C (see
Table 5-2 and Figure 5-3).
In addition to examining the best servicing architecture, it was found that the cases that
have positive NPVs tend to remain positive under the assumptions in the sensitivity
analysis.  This indicates that these cases, AQR 3, 4, and 5, are the most viable candidates
for satellite servicing, as they provide value to both the client and provider even under
varying assumptions.  The cases that consistently have positive NPVs, indicating their
market viability, are all cases that utilize DGI.
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Chapter 6.Conclusion
This chapter presents a summary of the research presented in this thesis.  The primary
goal of the research was to develop and apply a new approach to valuation that addresses
some of the downfalls of current valuation techniques.  This goal is addressed throughout
the thesis.
6.1 Research Conclusions Overview
6.1.1 Background
The thesis began by presenting a background discussion of the Aquarius launch vehicle
concept, the topics of real options and flexibility, and previous satellite servicing
research.  The Aquarius launch vehicle concept was a catalyst for this research, as a low
cost launch vehicle is one of the enablers for a satellite servicing market.  Including real
options in a valuation allows one to properly account for the flexibility inherent in many
projects.  While previous satellite servicing research has focused primarily on specific
architectures for upgrading satellites, this research explored the viability of the
commercial GEO satellite servicing market.
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6.1.2 A New Valuation Technique
Chapter 2 discussed the downfalls of current valuation techniques.  A new valuation
technique was presented - one that accounts for the interactions between technology and
economics, accounts for the flexibility in a project, and aids in the determination of the
“right” product. 
6.1.3 Client Value Analysis for Satellite Servicing
The valuation technique presented in Chapter 3 was utilized in Chapters 4 and 5 to
determine the viability of the GEO satellite servicing market.  Chapter 4 presented an
analysis of the client’s value for various competition and servicing approaches. 
The analysis indicates that both servicing and EP provide for increased NPV over the
current satellite configuration.  Although servicing provides greater NPV than EP,
servicing may also increase on-orbit risk.  A client’s decision between EP and servicing
would be based upon both confidence in the reliability of servicing and economic reward.
The most economically valuable type of servicing from the perspective of the client is to
use a tug spacecraft to perform both OR and NSSK maneuvers for the client spacecraft.
However, this case is completely reliant upon the provider, which increases its riskiness.
A more viable type of servicing is one that provides value and less risk.  The two
refueling cases, AQR 4 and 5, accomplish this. 
6.1.4 Provider Value Analysis for Satellite Servicing
After the client’s value for each type of servicing is analyzed, the value to the provider
must be considered.  Chapter 5 presents this analysis by evaluating the architectures,
costs, and revenues associated with each servicing configuration.  The value of each case
is examined. 
The initial and sensitivity analyses indicate that the GEO satellite servicing market is
viable.  The cases that are most attractive to both the client and the provider are the cases
that utilize DGI.  Additionally, the assumption of a low-cost launch vehicle was relaxed
to determine that the economically viable cases remain viable using the Atlas IIAS for
fuel delivery to GEO. After taking into account risk, the recommended method of
 157
servicing is AQR 5, which utilizes DGI and low frequency (less than one time per year)
refueling for stationkeeping.  This configuration provides value to both the client and
provider and is less reliant upon the provider, reducing the client’s risk.
6.2 Enabling Future Research
This thesis provides many opportunities for future research in the areas of valuation and
satellite servicing.  These opportunities include:
• Applying the valuation framework to different systems, including non-
aerospace systems
• Adapting the valuation framework to military and civil space systems by
using different metrics.  (e.g. utility or % increase in available payload instead
of revenues)
• Using the valuation framework to account for other types flexibility inherent
in servicing, building upon the satellite servicing analysis presented in this
thesis
• Quantitatively accounting for risk in valuations.  One approach for this is to
estimate the insurance costs associated with different services.
• Improve the cost modeling for servicing 
• Investigate the value of other types of satellite servicing, including upgrades
and inspection
In addition to those listed above, many promising and uncharted research opportunities
remain in the area of on-orbit servicing.
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Appendix A
Satellite Servicing Assumptions and Cases
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